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REGULATING THE BORDER
EUNICE LEE ∗
ABSTRACT
Under the current presidential administration, asylum seekers at
our southern border have prompted enormous political controversy. Amidst a record-breaking government shutdown, the separation of asylum-seeker families, the declaration of a national
emergency, and other drastic actions, agency adjudicators at the
border continued their daily work of screening asylum applicants.
This process was not, however, untouched by the ongoing politicization of the border. Rather, in June 2018, then-Attorney General
Jefferson Sessions issued a restrictive precedent decision, Matter
of A-B-, targeting domestic violence asylum claims. The Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) rushed to implement Matter
of A-B- in its border screenings, known as credible fear determinations. In December 2018, a federal district court judge enjoined
several aspects of that decision and its implementation in credible
fear processes. In the interim, however, DHS likely refouled refugees at the border as a result of the Attorney General’s asylum
interpretations.
In this Article I will examine border adjudications within the
structure of our administrative state. I will consider proper roles
between and within agencies, as well as among the agencies and
courts. Specifically, I will consider how the underlying aims of judicial review of agency decisionmaking should shape and guide
credible fear processes. I will argue that revised agency practices
and recalibrated judicial review can help ensure fair screenings:
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ones that abide by statutory design and thereby help avoid refoulement of refugees. For the agencies, I will suggest delayed or
declined implementation of restrictive Department of Justice asylum precedents at the border, as well as greater consideration of
the views of the asylum office. For the courts, I will propose
stronger assertion of Article III primacy in declaring “what the
law is” for screening purposes, as well as a recalibration of judicial review to favor agency expertise over politicized decisionmaking. I will conclude with recommendations for structural and statutory reforms of agency decisionmaking at the border and beyond.
INTRODUCTION
Each year, thousands of asylum seekers flee dangerous conditions in
their countries of origin and request safe haven in the United States, typically
at the U.S.-Mexico border. Under the current system, immigration officials
conduct curtailed screening interviews of asylum seekers, making quick decisions on whom to allow into our full immigration system. Since 2017, as
immigration officials went about this daily work, the Trump Administration
issued a spate of policies targeting the arrival of asylum seekers at the border
as a “threat,” “invasion,” and “emergency.” 1 I will examine these border
asylum adjudications at the present moment in our administrative state. How
do, and should, asylum screening interviews operate amidst the administration’s constant politicization of our border? The screenings—credible fear
proceedings within the expedited removal process—involve two levels of
agency adjudicators sitting in two separate executive departments. Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) asylum officers conduct curtailed,
quick interviews; and Department of Justice (“DOJ”) immigration judges review the interview outcomes in curtailed, quick hearings. Both apply the
domestic laws of Congress, implementing U.S. treaty obligations under the
Refugee Convention and Protocol. 2 And, although only one set of adjudicators sits within the DOJ—immigration judges—both agencies must apply the
precedential decisions of the Attorney General and their delegate, the Board
of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”).
To complicate matters further, the federal courts, of course, play a key
role in asylum decisions, as they also interpret the immigration laws. The
courts do so both with and without deference to agency interpretations, depending on the clarity of those laws (or the scope of Congressional delegation). But who properly pronounces the applicable contours of asylum law
1. See infra Part IV.
2. United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, opened for signature July
28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 150 (entered into force Apr. 22, 1954) [hereinafter Refugee Convention];
United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, opened for signature Jan. 31, 1967, 19
U.S.T. 6224, 606 U.N.T.S. 267 (entered into force Oct. 4, 1967) [hereinafter Refugee Protocol].
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in border screenings, and how and when should the various pronouncements
be implemented? And how should both DHS and DOJ approach the interagency nature of decisionmaking to ensure fidelity to statutory and constitutional design?
In answering these questions, I will consider how the underlying aims
of judicial review of agencies’ statutory interpretations should shape border
screenings. I will examine in particular the aims of Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. 3—but also consider how courts and
agencies might better approach asylum screenings even in Chevron’s absence. As a focal point for this discussion, I will explore developing law in
the area of domestic violence asylum claims. In a controversial June 2018
precedential decision, Matter of A-B-, 4 then-Attorney General Sessions reversed BIA precedent on the viability of domestic violence asylum claims—
and did so despite DHS disagreement on that point. Irrespective of its own
prior contrary positions, DHS proceeded to immediately implement the Matter of A-B- decision in credible fear interviews. But in December 2018, a
United States District Court judge in the District of Columbia, enjoined several aspects of the Matter of A-B- decision and DHS’s implementation in
credible fear proceedings at the border. Although the court’s decision was
correct in rejecting flawed interpretations of asylum law in Matter of A-Band the DHS guidance, and provided essential relief by enjoining them, the
injunction left in place a structurally-flawed system of credible fear adjudications.
My analysis will look closely at the structure of decisionmaking at the
border to uncover a tension between the two central justifications for judicial
deference to agency interpretations. Namely, the technocratic expertise of
the asylum adjudication system is easily undermined by the politically accountable design of that same system. Ultimately, I will conclude that Congress has pronounced which aspect of the system must prevail in the context
of asylum screenings, favoring technocratic expertise and non-politicized adjudication of claims. Moreover, the standard for credible fear, considered in
light of the respective roles of our three branches of government, requires
agencies to allow greater space for judicial pronouncements of law. As a
result, I will argue that agencies must proceed with significant delay and caution before implementing restrictive agency precedent at the border and
courts should assert their Article III primacy to declare “what the law is” 5 in
the context of credible fear interviews. These recommendations find support
under both Chevron and National Cable & Telecommunications Ass’n v.

3. 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984).
4. 27 I. & N. Dec. 316 (A.G. 2018).
5. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (“It is emphatically the province
and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.”).
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Brand X Internet Services, 6 as well as in the writings of Justice Gorsuch. 7 I
will further propose that courts recalibrate review to favor agency expertise,
specifically of the asylum corps, to achieve better fidelity to statutory design
of the asylum system. These core recommendations are rooted in our asylum
laws and in the proper weighing of agency expertise and would hold even in
the absence of Chevron.
My discussion proceeds in several parts. First, in Part I, I will engage
in a close review of our current frameworks for judicial review of agency
statutory interpretations, focusing on justifications for deference. Given the
present uncertainty over Chevron, I also briefly consider a post-Chevron
world. Next, in Part II, I will provide an overview of the governing statutory
frameworks for asylum and expedited removal, as well as practical limitations within the asylum system. With these legal frameworks in mind, in Part
III I will trace the historical trajectory of domestic violence asylum claims in
the agencies and courts as they lead to our present moment. I will next in
Part IV examine the politicized border under President Trump, then describe
how domestic violence asylum claims were targeted as one aspect of his restrictive policies in Part V. Finally, in Part VI I will propose new frameworks
for judicial review and implementation of agency precedent at the border,
then briefly touch upon potential interventions by Congress.
I. ON JUDICIAL DEFERENCE AND ITS REASONS
Although commentators have cast its future in doubt, 8 Chevron U.S.A.
Inc. v. National Resources Defense Council, Inc. continues to structure judicial review of agency interpretation. Scholars have long debated the extent
to which Chevron in fact changed prior judicial practices—but there is no
doubt that the decision has impacted and shaped the landscape in decades
since. 9 In this Part, I examine Chevron and key shifts in its application, with

6. 545 U.S. 967 (2005).
7. See infra Sections I.B, I.D.
8. See, e.g., Eric Citron, The Roots and Limits of Gorsuch’s Views on Chevron Deference,
SCOTUSBLOG (Mar. 17, 2017, 11:26 AM), https://www.scotusblog.com/2017/03/roots-limits-gorsuchs-views-chevron-deference/; Joshua Matz, The Imminent Demise of Chevron Deference?,
TAKE CARE BLOG (June 21, 2018), https://www.takecareblog.com/blog/the-imminent-demise-ofchevron-deference.
9. See, e.g., Mark Seidenfeld, A Syncopated Chevron: Emphasizing Reasoned Decisionmaking in Reviewing Agency Interpretations of Statutes, 73 TEX. L. REV. 83, 84 n.5 (1994) (noting that
some commentators “question whether Chevron represents the revolution in administrative law that
many have proclaimed”); Peter L. Strauss, “Deference” Is Too Confusing-Let’s Call Them “Chevron Space” and “Skidmore Weight,” 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1143, 1144 (2012) (“Administrative law
scholars have leveled a forest of trees exploring the mysteries of the Chevron approach contemporary judges take to reviewing law-related aspects of administrative action.”); Russel L. Weaver,
Some Realism About Chevron, 58 MO. L. REV. 129, 129–31 (1993) (claiming “Chevron’s importance has been exaggerated”). A Westlaw search reveals over 6000 reported cases citing the
decision in the United States Courts of Appeals.
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particular attention to rationales for deference articulated by jurists and scholars. I also briefly explore how deference may function in a post-Chevron
future (namely, a likely return to a pre-Chevron past). Finally, I trace Chevron’s application in the Court’s asylum jurisprudence.
A. Chevron—The Current Framework
In Chevron, the United States Supreme Court upheld the Reagan-era
Environmental Protection Agency’s (“EPA”) interpretation of the Clean Air
Act, rejecting a challenge brought by environmental groups. 10 The 1984 decision set forth a new framework for judicial review of agency decisionmaking. At issue in Chevron was the EPA’s determination that a cluster of pollution-emitting devices within a plant could be treated as a single “source,”
thereby avoiding stringent permitting requirements under the Clean Air
Act. 11 The Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit disagreed, reasoning that
such treatment failed to promote improved air quality and thus conflicted
with the Act. 12 The Supreme Court rejected not only the conclusion of the
court below, but also the framework used to get there.
Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, articulated a new two-step process for examining the legality of an agency interpretation. Under the first
step, courts ask whether the statutory language has clear meaning, 13 which
includes a court “employing traditional tools of statutory construction” to
“ascertain[] that Congress had an intention on the precise question at issue.” 14
If so, “that intention is the law and must be given effect.” 15 If, on the other
hand, the statute is ambiguous, the inquiry proceeds to step two, under which
courts defer to a reasonable agency interpretation.16
The majority provided two core sets of rationales for the high level of
deference at Chevron step two—what Professor Cass Sunstein has character-

10. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984).
11. Id. at 840.
12. Id. at 841–42.
13. Id. at 842–43.
14. Id. at 843 n.9.
15. Id. The application of canons and the extent to which they can “fill in” any gaps in meaning
in the text alone is oft-contested. Some commentators have observed that step one as a result takes
precedence in determining the outcomes of Chevron review. See, e.g., Gregory G. Garre, CERCLA,
Natural Resource Damage Assessments, and the D.C. Circuit’s Review of Agency Statutory Interpretations Under Chevron, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 932, 953 (1990) (“Chevron step one . . . has
become the ‘primary battleground’ on which challenges to agency statutory interpretations are
fought.”); Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent, 101 YALE L.J. 969, 990
(1992) (“In short, under the two-step Chevron framework, everything turns on the theory of judicial
interpretation adopted at step one.”).
16. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 837.
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ized as “dual commitments to specialized competence and democratic accountability.” 17 The first commitment, rooted in practicality and expertise,
recognizes the value of the knowledge of the agency. Put simply, “[j]udges
are not experts in the field” 18—whereas the administrative bodies set up to
daily administer a statute are. This justification acknowledges the realities
of the modern administrative state, wherein technocratic agencies play an
outsized role in governance and rulemaking. 19 The administration and regulation of the Clean Air Act in Chevron, for example, required expertise in
quantifying emissions, assessing new technologies, and measuring impacts
on the environment and public health. 20 The Court described the statute itself
as “lengthy, detailed, technical, [and] complex.” 21
The second reason for deferring to agency decisions is rooted in separation of powers and political accountability principles. Justice Stevens explained that because judges are not part of the two political branches of government, they must not make decisions on the basis of “personal policy
preferences.” 22 In contrast, agencies can properly rely upon the policy views
of the incumbent administration to inform their judgements, as they are ultimately democratically accountable to the people via the President. 23 Thus,
“it is entirely appropriate for this political branch of the Government to make
such policy choices—resolving the competing interests which Congress itself
either inadvertently did not resolve, or intentionally left to be resolved by the
agency.” 24

17. Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187, 206 (2006). The Court in Chevron also indicated that congressional delegation of interpretive authority to the agency could underlie deference; as explained in Section I.C. below, this line of reasoning was later taken up by the
Court in what many commentators have referred to as a Chevron step zero.
18. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865.
19. Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 DUKE
L.J. 511, 516 (1989) (“Broad delegation to the Executive is the hallmark of the modern administrative state; agency rulemaking powers are the rule rather than, as they once were, the exception . . . .”).
20. See The Clean Air Act: Solving Air Pollution Problems with Science and Technology, U.S.
ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/clean-air-act-overview/clean-air-act-solvingair-pollution-problems-science-and-technology (last visited Jan. 28, 2020).
21. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 848. Justice Scalia, however, has noted that the precise question at
issue—is a “bubble” a “source”?—is a fairly straightforward interpretive inquiry well within the
competencies of the federal courts. He expressed skepticism over the “expertise” rationale of Chevron. See Scalia, supra note 19, at 514 (“The cases, old and new, that accept administrative interpretations, often refer to the ‘expertise’ of the agencies in question, their intense familiarity with the
history and purposes of the legislation at issue, their practical knowledge of what will best effectuate
those purposes. In other words, they are more likely than the courts to reach the correct result.”).
22. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 865–66.
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Although commentators and some Justices have expressed disagreement with these underlying aims, 25 the Court has reiterated both the agency
expertise and political accountability rationales over the years.26 In a recent
decision, Kisor v. Wilkie, 27 the Court similarly rooted “Auer deference” 28—
for agency interpretations of their own regulations—in the dual facets of
agency’s specialized knowledge and their political/policy functions.29
B. Step Two’s Expansion (and Its Cabining by Critics)
In 2000, the Court expanded the scope of agency authority at Chevron
step two. In National Cable & Telecommunications Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Services, a decision penned by Justice Thomas, the Court held that a reasonable agency interpretation of an ambiguous statute prevails over a contrary judicial interpretation of that same statute. 30 Only where the prior court
decision construes an unambiguous statute—that is, under Chevron step
one—does the prior judicial interpretation “trump[]” the agency’s contrary
interpretation. 31 Otherwise, under Chevron step two, the agency’s construction of the ambiguous statute will prevail so long as it is reasonable.
Brand X engendered strong criticism, including a spirited dissent by Justice Scalia, joined in part by Justices Souter and Ginsberg. In a single member portion of his dissent, Justice Scalia described the majority decision as
25. See, e.g., Scalia, supra note 19, at 514. Justice Scalia expressed skepticism over the rationale of agency expertise, reasoning that Chevron should instead survive for reflecting proper
deference to the policymaking function of agencies and for providing legislators with a bright line
rule to guide legislative design. Id. at 514–17, 521; see also Citron, supra note 8 (discussing Justice
Gorsuch’s critiques and their alignment with conventional “high-school civics” teachings of separation of powers).
26. In Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp. v. LTV Corp., for example, the Court reaffirmed that
“practical agency expertise is one of the principal justifications behind Chevron deference.” 496
U.S. 633, 651–52 (1990). The Court there deferred to the agency administrator’s decision to restore
certain pension plans under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, reversing the determination of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit that the agency
decision was arbitrary and capricious. Id. at 647. As explained in Section I.E. below, the Court has
also reaffirmed the political accountability principle through the years, deeming it particularly
strong in the area of immigration.
27. 139 S. Ct. 2400 (2019).
28. Auer deference refers to the standard of review for agencies’ interpretations of their own
regulations, announced in Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (1997).
29. See Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2413 (plurality opinion) (Kagan, J.) (rooting Auer in the “unique
expertise” of agencies and the fact that “they are subject to the supervision of the President, who in
turn answers to the public”); see also id. at 2416–17 (majority opinion) (explaining that for Auer to
even apply, a decision must be authoritative and understood to “emanate from those [agency heads
or] actors” to whom Congress delegated authority and must “implicate its substantive expertise”).
Justice Kagan also identified agencies’ ability to conduct factual investigation as a reason for deference. Id. at 2413.
30. 545 U.S. 967, 1003 (2005).
31. Id. at 982 (“A court’s prior judicial construction of a statute trumps an agency construction
otherwise entitled to Chevron deference only if the prior court decision holds that its construction
follows from the unambiguous terms of the statute and thus leaves no room for agency discretion.”).
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“yet another breathtaking novelty: judicial decisions subject to reversal by
executive officers.” 32 He lamented the majority’s failure to take seriously the
primacy of the judiciary in interpreting law. Or, as he put it, “Article III
courts do not sit to render decisions that can be reversed or ignored by executive officers.” 33
In his authorship of Tenth Circuit immigration decisions, then-Judge
Gorsuch took up Justice Scalia’s line of reasoning to cabin the temporal reach
of Brand X. He accepted that Brand X permitted the BIA to “effectively
overrule[]” a court, 34 but limited the ability of agency decisions under Brand
X to operate retroactively and, to a certain extent, prospectively.
In 2015 in De Niz Robles v. Lynch, 35 then-Judge Gorsuch wrote for the
unanimous panel holding the BIA could not retroactively apply a Brand-Xinvoking agency decision that conflicted with the Tenth Circuit’s prior judicial interpretation of an ambiguous statute. 36 At issue was whether the petitioner, Mr. De Niz Robles, could obtain permanent resident status even with
multiple unlawful entries. Under the Tenth Circuit’s 2006 interpretation of
the Immigration Code in Padilla-Caldera v. Gonzales (“Padilla-Caldera
I”), 37 Mr. De Niz Robles was eligible for permanent residence.38 However,
under a 2007 BIA decision, Matter of Briones, 39 which invoked Brand X to
reject Padilla-Caldera I, he was not. 40 Mr. De Niz Robles had applied for
permanent residence after the Tenth Circuit issued Padilla-Caldera I and before the BIA issued Matter of Briones. Then-Judge Gorsuch concluded that
Matter of Briones could not retroactively apply to Mr. De Niz Robles, and
that accordingly Padilla-Caldera I—the judicial decision—controlled his
case. Thus, Mr. De Niz Robles remained eligible for permanent residence.
In explaining why the agency decision should apply only prospectively,

32. Id. at 1016 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
33. Id. at 1017.
34. De Niz Robles v. Lynch, 803 F.3d 1165, 1171 (10th Cir. 2015).
35. 803 F.3d 1165 (10th Cir. 2015).
36. Id. at 1169. The 2006 Tenth Circuit decision, Padilla–Caldera v. Gonzales (“Padilla-Caldera I”) held that the immigration courts had authority to grant permanent residence to petitioners
with multiple unlawful entries. The Board of Immigration Appeals’s (“BIA”) 2007 decision, Matter
of Briones, invoked Brand X to reach to the opposite conclusion, holding instead that immigrants
with multiple entries were barred from obtaining permanent residence from the immigration courts.
24 I. & N. Dec. 355, 371 n.9 (B.I.A. 2007). Ultimately, the Tenth Circuit in a 2011 decision, Padilla-Caldera v. Holder (“Padilla-Caldera II”), deferred to the agency interpretation in Matter of
Briones. 637 F.3d 1140 (10th Cir. 2011).
37. 453 F.3d 1237 (10th Cir. 2006).
38. Id. at 1244.
39. 24 I. & N. Dec. 355 (B.I.A. 2007).
40. Id. at 371.
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Judge Gorsuch noted that agency interpretations are policy-driven and therefore lack permanency: “the agency judgment to which the court defers is not
‘a once-and-for-always definition of what the statute means.’” 41
In a 2011 decision, Padilla-Caldera v. Holder (“Padilla-Caldera II”), 42
the Tenth Circuit reexamined the statute at issue in Padilla-Caldera I. It held
that the BIA’s intervening decision in Matter of Briones was reasonable and
thus entitled to Chevron deference under Brand X. 43 Thus, the Tenth Circuit
in Padilla-Caldera II held that, pursuant to Matter of Briones, petitioners
with multiple unlawful reentries would no longer be eligible for permanent
residence within the Tenth Circuit.44
Yet, in a 2016 decision, Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 45 then-Judge Gorsuch authored another Tenth Circuit decision cabining the temporal reach of
the agency decision—this time ruling that, in certain cases, the BIA’s decision in Matter of Briones could not apply even prospectively. 46 Mr.
Gutierrez-Brizuela, applied for permanent residence after the BIA decided
Matter of Briones in 2007—but before the Tenth Circuit decided PadillaCaldera II in 2011. 47
Writing for a unanimous panel, Judge Gorsuch concluded that in this
posture as well, the judicial construction from Padilla-Caldera I must apply.
He characterized the court’s prior decision in De Niz Robles as a pronouncement that the BIA’s decision in Matter of Briones “was not legally effective
in the Tenth Circuit until this court discharged its obligation under Chevron
step two and Brand X to determine that the statutory provisions at issue were
indeed ambiguous, that the BIA’s interpretation of them was indeed reasonable.” 48 He stressed that people need to be able to rely on “judicial declarations of what the law is.” 49
In a separate concurrence, not joined by the rest of the panel, then-Judge
Gorsuch took on the “elephant in the room with us today”: the fact that, in
his view, “Chevron and Brand X permit executive bureaucracies to swallow
huge amounts of core judicial and legislative power and concentrate federal
power in a way that seems more than a little difficult to square with the Constitution of the framers’ design.” 50 He concluded that “Chevron seems no
41. De Niz Robles, 803 F.3d at 1174 n.7 (quoting Garfias-Rodriguez v. Holder, 702 F.3d 504,
515–16 (10th Cir. 2012)).
42. 637 F.3d 1140 (10th Cir. 2011)
43. Id. at 1153.
44. See id.
45. 834 F.3d 1142 (10th Cir. 2016).
46. See id. at 1145.
47. Recall that Mr. De Niz Robles, meanwhile, had applied for permanent residence before the
BIA issued Matter of Briones.
48. Gutierrez-Brizuela, 834 F.3d at 1145.
49. Id. at 1143.
50. Id. at 1149 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
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less than a judge-made doctrine for the abdication of the judicial duty.” 51 By
permitting courts to avoid their core function of interpreting law and saying
what it is, he argued, the doctrine invites the political branches to intrude on
judicial functions, raising due process and equal protection concerns. 52 Judge
Gorsuch questioned whether the Constitution in fact permits the legislature
to delegate lawmaking authority to the executive and cautioned against a doctrine that allows “an avowedly politicized administrative agent seeking to
pursue whatever policy whim may rule the day” to curtail people’s liberties. 53
He concluded his concurrence with a call to overrule Chevron. 54
C. Step Zero
In addition to disagreeing with Chevron’s fundamentals, then-Judge
Gorsuch took the Supreme Court to task for muddying its waters considerably in its subsequent decisions. 55 And indeed, although Brand X expanded
the agency’s authority at step two, the emergence of what Professors Thomas
Merrill and Kristin Hickman termed a Chevron “step zero” shifted the balance of power back toward the courts—but in somewhat unpredictable fashion. 56 As Professor Sunstein notes, the question of applicability of Chevron
was “largely invisible” in the decision’s first decade, with several decisions
applying its two-step formula without considering the threshold question:
Should Chevron framework even be used? 57 In a series of cases, most notably in United States v. Mead Corp., 58 the Court announced a more searching
inquiry along these lines. 59
51. Id. at 1152.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 1153.
54. Id. at 1158 (“We managed to live with the administrative state before Chevron. We could
do it again.”).
55. Id. at 1157 (“Neither, respectfully, does looking to the Supreme Court’s case law supply a
great deal of guidance on how to apply Mead’s balancing test.”).
56. See Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833, 836
(2001) (coining the phrase Chevron “step zero” to describe “the inquiry that must be made in deciding whether courts should turn to the Chevron framework at all”).
57. Sunstein, supra note 17, at 208. Professor Sunstein also explores then-Judge Breyer’s and
Justice Scalia’s differing views on Chevron in its earlier days. Whereas Breyer advocated for a
more flexible case-by-case approach to Chevron, in which judges take a hard look at the legislative
text and context to ascertain whether an intent to delegate is present, or at the very least, not implausible, see Stephen Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of Law and Policy, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 363,
370–82 (1986), Scalia urged a uniform rule of applying Chevron across the board, which would be
easier for litigants and the lower courts to apply and more readily put legislators on notice regarding
the interpretive authority of agencies, Scalia, supra note 19, at 516–17. Or, as Professor Sunstein
observes, the two clashed over whether Chevron should be applied as a standard or a rule. Sunstein,
supra note 17, at 192.
58. 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
59. Id. In an earlier case, Christensen v. Harris County, Justice Scalia penned a concurrence
criticizing the majority’s application of step-zero-type analysis to an opinion letter of a Department
of Labor Wage and Hour Division administrator. 529 U.S. 576, 589 (2000) (Scalia, J., concurring).
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In Mead, the Court held Chevron deference is afforded only where Congress delegates authority to the agency to make rules carrying the force of
law and where an agency interpretation exercises that authority. 60 To decide
whether delegation exists absent an express statement by Congress, the Court
looked to the degree of formality and procedure involved in the agency decision. 61 The Mead majority determined that delegated authority, and thus the
Chevron framework, did not apply to a tariff classification ruling by the U.S.
Customs Service. 62 That, however, did not mean no deference at all was
warranted. Rather, the Court applied its 1944 decision in Skidmore v. Swift, 63
looking to whether the agency decision had the “power to persuade.” 64
Justice Scalia dissented in Mead, urging stronger adherence to Chevron’s simpler two-step inquiry. 65 Rather than engaging in a step zero-type
analysis, he argued, courts should simply look for ambiguity in the statute.
If present, the “[a]mbiguity means Congress intended agency discretion. Any
resolution of the ambiguity by the administering agency that is authoritative—that represents the official position of the agency—must be accepted
by the courts if it is reasonable.” 66 Justice Scalia characterized Skidmore as
an “anachronism” and criticized the Court for “breathing new life” into it. 67
As Professor Sunstein has noted, Mead reflects that “[t]o a significant extent,
Justice Breyer has succeeded in ensuring case-by-case assessments of
whether Congress intended to delegate law-interpreting power to agencies.” 68

The majority determined opinion letters lacked the “force of law” and thus “do not warrant Chevronstyle deference.” Id. at 587. Justice Scalia disagreed and argued deference was due simply because
the opinion letter reflected the authoritative view of the Secretary of Labor; he joined the judgment
of the Court, however, because he viewed the Secretary’s interpretation as unreasonable. Id. at 589
(Scalia, J., concurring).
60. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. at 226–27, 229.
61. Id. at 229 (“[A] . . . good indicator of delegation meriting Chevron treatment in express
congressional authorizations to engage in the process of rulemaking or adjudication that produces
regulations or rulings for which deference is claimed.”).
62. Id. at 226–28.
63. 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
64. Mead Corp., 433 U.S. at 226–28 (quoting Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140).
65. Id. at 239, 257 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
66. Id. at 257.
67. Id. at 250.
68. Sunstein, supra note 17, at 247. A 2019 decision penned by Justice Gorsuch confirms the
robustness of that inquiry. In Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis, the majority declined to apply Chevron
deference to an interpretation of the National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”) that implicated not
only the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”), which it administers, but also the Federal Arbitration Act, which it does not. 138 S. Ct. 1612 (2018). The NLRB had held that the NLRA prohibited the enforcement of agreements requiring individualized arbitration, rather than class or collective actions. The majority held that petitioner’s (and NLRB’s) view was foreclosed by the plain
text of the statute. It went on to explain that petitioners could not “seek[] shelter in Chevron” because “[o]ne of Chevron’s essential premises is simply missing” where an agency interpretation
exceeds the scope of its delegated authority by limiting a second statute it does not administer. Id.
at 1629.
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D. Before, Outside, and After(?) Chevron
The Skidmore decision, newly applied in Mead, predated Chevron by
some decades. In that 1944 decision, the Court pronounced a more flexible
standard for judicial consideration of agency statutory interpretation. Recent
shifts in the Court suggest a possible return to this earlier approach.
Skidmore considered whether overtime pay under the Fair Labor Standards Act applied to on-call employees. 69 The lower courts had concluded
simply that it could not, whereas the agency adopted a more nuanced view. 70
The Court, reversing, considered that the views of the agency, “while not
controlling upon the courts by reason of their authority, do constitute a body
of experience and informed judgment to which courts and litigants may
properly resort for guidance.” 71 It continued, “The weight of such a judgment
in a particular case will depend upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking
power to control.” 72 The Court also noted that deference could be due based
on agencies’ “specialized experience and broader investigations and information.” 73
Recently in Kisor v. Wilkie, a bare majority kept in place Auer deference, 74 which applies a Chevron-type two-step inquiry to agency interpretations of their own regulations. 75 Although Chevron itself was not at issue,
the decision reveals much about how a future Court might treat both doctrines. Justice Roberts joined in a 5-4 opinion by Justice Kagan, preserving
Auer largely on grounds of stare decisis. 76 True to his reputation as the most
ardent opponent of current deference frameworks, 77 Justice Gorsuch penned
a concurrence joined fully by Justice Thomas, and in part by Justices Alito
and Kavanaugh, arguing for Auer’s demise. 78 Echoing his Tenth Circuit concurrence in Gutierrez-Brizuela criticizing Chevron, Justice Gorsuch urged
the judiciary to reclaim its primacy in declaring what law is. He opened by

69. Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 135.
70. Id. at 134–40.
71. Id. at 140.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 139; see also Mead, 533 U.S. at 234.
74. 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2407 (2019).
75. Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (1997).
76. The majority opinion also imposed a more searching inquiry at the outset to determine
whether Auer should actually apply, that is, an Auer step zero. See Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2416–18.
77. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Justice Gorsuch Fulfills Expectations from the Right and the Left,
ABA JOURNAL (Aug. 1, 2019, 6:00 AM), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/chemerinskyjustice-gorsuch-fulfills-expectations-from-right-and-left (“Many predict that [Justice Gorsuch] will
be a leader on the court in urging greater judicial oversight over the administrative state. His opinions so far suggest that indeed he will try to push the court in this direction.”).
78. Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2425 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
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voicing particular concern for the consolidation of power in the executive visà-vis ordinary people, castigating Auer for “creat[ing] a ‘systematic judicial
bias in favor of the federal government, the most powerful of parties, and
against everyone else.’”79
Justice Gorsuch’s concurrence also expressly identified Skidmore as the
would-be status quo in a post-Auer world (and presumably, post-Chevron one
as well): “Overruling Auer would have taken us directly back to Skidmore,
liberating courts to decide cases based on their independent judgment and
‘follow [the] agency’s [view] only to the extent it is persuasive.’” 80
Notably, his approach under Skidmore allows agency expertise to serve
as a basis for deference but moves decidedly away from political accountability as a reason. On expertise, he stated plainly, “no one doubts that courts
should pay close attention to an expert agency’s views on technical questions
in its field.” 81 Although he believed courts should remain open to other interpretations to a greater extent than permitted under Auer, he nevertheless
agreed with the majority that “of course . . . respectful consideration” is due
to the expertise of the agency. 82
On the political accountability rationale, Justice Gorsuch was decidedly
less sanguine. Far from justifying deference to an agency, the political nature
of agencies in his view underscores the danger of deference frameworks.
Judges, in his view, should not be “forced to subordinate their own views
about what the law means to those of a political actor,” 83 but instead must
“guard the people from the arbitrary use of governmental power.” 84 The
founders, he asserted, “knew that when political actors are left free not only
to adopt and enforce written laws, but also to control the interpretation of
those laws, the legal rights of ‘litigants with unpopular or minority causes
or . . . who belong to despised or suspect classes’ count for little.”85 He continued:
Maybe the powerful, well-heeled, popular, and connected can
wheedle favorable outcomes from a system like that—but what
about everyone else? They are left always a little unsure what the
law is, at the mercy of political actors and the shifting winds of
popular opinion, and without the chance for a fair hearing before a
79. Id. (quoting Paul Larkin & Elizabeth Slattery, The World After Seminole Rock and Auer,
42 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 625, 641 (2019)). His concurrence also explored at length how, in his
view, the Auer framework violates the Administrative Procedure Act. Id. at 2432–35.
80. Id. at 2447 (alterations in original) (quoting Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 269
(2006)).
81. Id. at 2442.
82. Id. at 2443.
83. Id. at 2429.
84. Id. at 2438.
85. Id. at 2437 (alteration in original) (quoting Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389, 412
(1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting)).
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neutral judge. The rule of law begins to bleed into the rule of
men. 86
Thus, whereas agency expertise would continue to receive deference
from the courts even under Justice Gorsuch’s approach, politically-driven
agency decisions likely would not.
E. Chevron in Asylum Law
In the realm of immigration, the Supreme Court has extended Chevron
to precedent decisions of the BIA, including on substantive asylum law. It
has done so in ways, moreover, that to some extent have allowed the “rule of
law . . . to bleed into the rule of men,” 87 as Justice Gorsuch warned, by deferring to political considerations. 88
In 1987 in Immigration & Naturalization Services v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 89 the Court first applied the Chevron framework to the refugee definition, addressing the meaning of a “well-founded fear” of persecution. 90 The
agency had construed “well-founded fear” for asylum purposes to require a
more-likely-than-not showing—the same standard governing withholding of
removal, a lesser form of protection. 91 Writing for the Court, Justice Stevens
disagreed with the agency, applying statutory canons of construction to conclude that the two standards were not identical.92
Notably, the Court found ambiguity in the term “well-founded fear,” but
nevertheless rejected the agency’s construction at step one of Chevron because the statute was sufficiently clear in differentiating between the two
standards. The Court recognized that Chevron deference to the BIA as the
delegate of the Attorney General was appropriate where the BIA gave “concrete meaning through a process of case-by-case adjudication.” 93 However,
it deemed the question presented by the case as properly resolved by the
courts:
[O]ur task today is much narrower, and is well within the province
of the Judiciary. We do not attempt to set forth a detailed description of how the “well-founded fear” test should be applied. Instead, we merely hold that the Immigration Judge and the BIA were
incorrect in holding that the two standards are identical. 94

86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

Id. at 2438.
Id.
See supra Section I.D.
480 U.S. 421 (1987).
Id. at 448.
Id.
Id. at 448–49.
Id. at 448.
Id. (footnote omitted).
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In a footnote, the Court additionally noted that the BIA’s shifting positions on the matter undermined the government’s claim of deference. 95 The
Court did not provide a controlling definition of well-founded fear, instead
remanding to the agency to redefine the term. A lengthy portion of its opinion explored legislative history and international law understandings to reach
its conclusion. This analysis drew spirited criticism from Justice Scalia in a
separate concurrence for (in his view) ranging beyond the step one inquiry
into statutory ambiguity. 96
In a 1999 case, Immigration & Naturalization Services v. AguirreAguirre, 97 a unanimous Court again applied Chevron to the BIA’s construction of domestic refugee law. In this case, it deferred to the agency construction. 98 At issue was the test developed by the BIA for the serious non-political crime bar to withholding of removal. 99 The BIA’s standard focused on
whether the common-law criminal nature of the act outweighed its political
aspects. 100 The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit rejected
the BIA’s test, concluding that adjudicators must also consider other factors,
including the relative seriousness of the conduct vis-à-vis risk of persecution,
as well as the atrociousness of the act.101 The Supreme Court disagreed. It
95. The Court explained:
An additional reason for rejecting the INS’s request for heightened deference to its
position is the inconsistency of the positions the BIA has taken through the years. An
agency interpretation of a relevant provision which conflicts with the agency’s earlier
interpretation is “entitled to considerably less deference” than a consistently held agency
view.
Id. at 446 n.30 (quoting Watt v. Alaska, 451 U.S. 259, 273 (1981)).
96. In a concurrence, Justice Scalia agreed that plain textual analysis supported the majority’s
conclusion, as “the INS’s interpretation is clearly inconsistent with the plain meaning of that phrase
and the structure of the Act.” Id. at 453 (Scalia. J., concurring). He disagreed strongly, however,
with the majority’s application of canons of statutory construction at Chevron step one, as well as
its in-depth exploration of legislative history. In his view:
The Court . . . implies that courts may substitute their interpretation of a statute for that
of an agency whenever, “[e]mploying traditional tools of statutory construction,” they
are able to reach a conclusion as to the proper interpretation of the statute. But this approach would make deference a doctrine of desperation, authorizing courts to defer only
if they would otherwise be unable to construe the enactment at issue. This is not an
interpretation but an evisceration of Chevron.
Id. at 454 (alteration in original) (citation omitted).
97. 526 U.S. 415 (1999).
98. Id. at 424–25.
99. Id. at 418–19. Withholding of removal prohibits the return of refugees to their countries
of origin where they will likely face persecution but provides less permanent status and fewer rights
than full asylum status. The applicable provision for serious non-political crime bar at the time was
located at 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(2)(C) (1994) (repealed 1996). Currently, the serious non-political
bars for asylum and withholding are at 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(A)(iii) (2009) and 8 U.S.C.
§ 1231(b)(3)(B)(iii) (2012), respectively.
100. See Matter of McMullen, 19 I. & N. Dec. 90, 97–98 (B.I.A. 1984) (discussing AguirreAguirre, 526 U.S. at 422).
101. Aguirre-Aguirre v. Immigration & Naturalization Servs., 121 F.3d 521, 522 (9th Cir. 1997),
rev’d, 526 U.S. 415 (1999).
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held that the circuit court erred in both failing to apply Chevron and failing
to defer to the BIA’s interpretation. 102 The Court emphasized, “judicial deference to the Executive Branch is especially appropriate in the immigration
context where officials ‘exercise especially sensitive political functions that
implicate questions of foreign relations.’” 103
In Negusie v. Holder, 104 the Supreme Court reiterated this same point—
the “special importance” of judicial deference in immigration due to political
and foreign relations implications. 105 Its decision, however, declined to actually apply Chevron in rejecting the BIA’s interpretation of the persecutor
of others bar to asylum and withholding. 106 The Court determined the BIA
had wrongly considered itself bound by an earlier Supreme Court decision,
Fedorenko v. United States, 107 which had interpreted a different statutory provision. Thus, the Court concluded “that the BIA has not exercised its interpretive authority but, instead, has determined that Fedorenko controls.” 108
This “mistaken assumption,” it continued, “stems from a failure to recognize
the inapplicability of the principle of statutory construction invoked in Fe-

102. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. at 424–25.
103. Id. at 425 (quoting Immigration & Naturalization Servs. v. Abudu, 485 U.S. 94, 110
(1988)). The Court in Abudu held that federal courts review BIA denials of motions to reopen based
on untimeliness under an abuse of discretion standard. It explained that deference to the administrative agency was due to political nature of INS proceedings:
In sum, although all adjudications by administrative agencies are to some degree judicial
and to some degree political—and therefore an abuse-of-discretion standard will often
apply to agency adjudications not governed by specific statutory commands—INS officials must exercise especially sensitive political functions that implicate questions of foreign relations, and therefore the reasons for giving deference to agency decisions on petitions for reopening or reconsideration in other administrative contexts apply with even
greater force in the INS context.
Abudu, 485 U.S. at 110 (footnotes omitted). Mr. Abudu, the respondent, had received a prior deportation order but sought to reopen his case to apply for asylum. Id. at 97.
104. 555 U.S. 511 (2009).
105. Id. at 517.
106. The persecutor bar applies to individuals who “assisted, or otherwise participated in the
persecution of any person on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social
group, or political opinion.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (2012) (for asylum); see also id.
§ 1231(b)(3)(B)(i) (for withholding).
107. 449 U.S. 490 (1980). Fedorenko interpreted the Displaced Persons Act of 1948, Pub. L.
No. 80-774, 62 Stat. 1009, amended by Act of June 16, 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-555, 64 Stat. 219
(codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1951–66 (1951)) (no longer in force). The Court held that
under the statute, serving as a concentration camp armed guard—even if involuntary—amounted to
participating in persecution under the Nazi regime and rendered the applicant ineligible for a Displaced Persons Act visa. In concluding that a voluntariness requirement did not apply, the Court
considered that a different provision in the same act—barring individuals who “voluntarily assisted
the enemy forces”—did include an express voluntariness consideration. Fedorenko, 449 U.S. at
512. In contrast, the persecutor bar for asylum and withholding considered in Negusie does not
appear alongside any other bar expressly requiring voluntariness. See Negusie, 555 U.S. at 518–19.
108. Negusie, 555 U.S. at 522.
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dorenko, as well as a failure to appreciate the differences in statutory purpose.” 109 Applying the ordinary remand rule, 110 the Court remanded the case
for the agency to construe the bar in the first instance.
These immigration decisions reveal a tendency for the Court to locate
the rationale for Chevron deference in the area of asylum in the political accountability and policy functions of the agency. They also reveal, however,
a willingness to scrutinize the logic of the agency’s reasoning at step one, as
in Cardoza-Fonseca, and to engage in a step-zero-type look into whether the
agency in fact exercised its delegated authority, as in Negusie. AguirreAguirre, however, confirms that within those bounds, the Court has been
willing to defer to the agency, viewing asylum law as implicating sensitive
political and foreign relations functions. Yet, as I explore in Part II, this view
of asylum law does not properly reflect Congress’s intent in designing a depoliticized asylum system.
II. ASYLUM AND EXPEDITED REMOVAL
Below, I provide a brief overview of the core international and domestic
refugee frameworks, as well as the U.S. asylum system, particularly as they
relate to expedited screening processes in immigration law. I also discuss the
structure of asylum decisionmaking.
A. Refugee Protocol and Act
In 1968, the United States signed onto the U.N. Protocol Relating to the
Status of Refugees (“Refugee Protocol”),111 which incorporated the key substantive provisions of the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of
Refugees (“Refugee Convention”).112 Under these conventions, a refugee is
an individual who, “owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or
political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or,
owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that
country.” 113 At the heart of these instruments is a prohibition on the return
of refugees to persecution, or refoulement—a norm that has since risen to the
level of customary international law.114

109. Id.
110. See Immigration & Naturalization Servs. v. Orlando Ventura, 537 U.S. 12, 16–17 (2002)
(per curiam) (holding that if BIA has not yet spoken on “a matter that statutes place primarily in
agency hands,” the ordinary remand requires court to “giv[e] the BIA the opportunity to address the
matter in the first instance in light of its own expertise”).
111. Refugee Protocol, supra note 2.
112. Refugee Convention, supra note 2.
113. Refugee Convention, supra note 112, at art. 1(A)(2).
114. See, e.g., Sir Elihu Lauterpacht & Daniel Bethlehem, The Scope and Content of the Principle of Non-Refoulement: Opinion, in REFUGEE PROTECTION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 87, 149
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Over a decade later, Congress passed the Refugee Act of 1980, 115 which
created a comprehensive system for the adjudication of refugee claims of individuals abroad and in the United States. 116 Via the substantive provisions
of this law, Congress intended to bring the United States into compliance
with its obligations under the Refugee Protocol—as emphasized explicitly
throughout the legislative history. 117 Central to the 1980 Act was the enactment of a uniform refugee definition derived from international law. 118 This
core definition does not require a showing of certain or even likely harm, but
rather only a “well-founded fear” that the individual will be persecuted upon
return to her country. The Supreme Court has stated that a one in ten chance
of persecution meets this standard. 119
Critically, Congress enacted the Refugee Act with the explicit aim of
changing the executive branch’s prior ad hoc and discriminatory approach to
refugee protection, which was driven by foreign policy, geography, and ideological concerns. The Senate Report accompanying the Senate version of
the Act highlights “repeal[ing] the current immigration law’s discriminatory
treatment of refugees by providing a new definition of a refugee that recognizes the plight of homeless people all over the world” as the first of the bill’s
“five basic objectives.” 120
B. Asylum Seekers at the Border: Expedited Removal
Prior to 1996, all individuals seeking asylum generally had a right to an
evidentiary hearing on their asylum claim. Individuals apprehended at ports
of entry, including border ports, had fewer procedural protections than indi-

(Erika Feller et al. eds., 2003) (ebook) (“[N]on-refoulement must be regarded as a principle of customary international law.”); United Nations High Comm’r for Refugees, The Principle of Non-Refoulement as a Norm of Customary International Law, Response to the Questions posed to UNHCR
by the Federal Constitutional Court of the Federal Republic of Germany in cases 2 BvR 1938/93, 2
BvR 1953/93, 2 BvR 1954/93, REFWORLD (Jan. 31, 1994), https://www.refworld.org/docid/437b6db64.html.
115. Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102.
116. Id.; 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (2012); see also Deborah Anker & Michael Posner, The
Forty Year Crisis: A Legislative History of the Refugee Act of 1980, 19 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 9, 30
(1981).
117. See Immigration & Naturalization Servs. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 436 (1987)
(“If one thing is clear from the legislative history of the new definition of ‘refugee,’ and indeed the
entire 1980 Act, it is that one of Congress’ primary purposes was to bring United States refugee law
into conformance with the 1967 United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees . . . .”).
118. Refugee Convention, supra note 112, at art. 1(A)(2).
119. See Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 440.
120. S. REP. 96-256, at 1–2 (1980); see also 125 CONG. REC. 4481 (1979) (“The basic purpose
of the bill I introduce today is to update the law—and to help insure greater equity in our treatment
of refugees and displaced persons and to establish a more orderly procedure for their admission into
the United States in reasonable numbers.”).
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viduals already in the United States but, nevertheless, would receive an exclusion hearing before an immigration judge on their asylum claims. 121 Although less robust than the deportation hearing received by individuals (including asylum seekers) already in the interior of the United States, exclusion
hearings permitted asylum applicants to present and receive evidence, give
testimony, secure witnesses, and appeal an adverse decision. 122 In 1996,
however, Congress passed the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act of 1996 (“IIRIRA”). 123 IIRIRA eliminated deportation
and exclusion hearings, replacing them with more general removal proceedings and curtailed admission procedures. 124 Most notably—with regard to
individuals seeking but not yet granted admission to the United States—
IIRIRA largely did away with the right to an evidentiary hearing, with few
exceptions. 125 Instead, it created a curtailed process called expedited removal, which made it far easier for immigration authorities to remove individuals at the border. 126
Under the new scheme, immigration enforcement officials can issue an
administrative order and promptly return an individual to their home country,
even absent further review or a hearing before a neutral adjudicator.127 In
essence, expedited removal allows DHS to act as the prosecutor and the judge
with respect to applicants for admission. 128 IIRIRA authorizes expedited removal of individuals who arrive at ports of entry without valid entry documents or who commit misrepresentation or fraud. 129 It further permits (but
does not require) the use of expedited removal for individuals who have been
in the United States for less than two years and who are similarly inadmissible due to fraud or lack of entry documents. 130
Until 2019, the government applied expedited removal to the following
three groups of individuals: (1) “arriving aliens” who seek to enter the United
121. See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) (1952).
122. Id.; see, e.g., Augustin v. Sava, 735 F.2d 32, 37 (2d Cir. 1984) (holding that robust procedural rights, including a right to translation of proceedings, was required under statute with regard
to asylum claim, and under the Fifth Amendment with regard to mandatory withholding claim).
123. Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009–546 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8
U.S.C.).
124. Id.
125. Certain individuals who are applicants for admission do continue to have a right to a hearing, if they claim they are in fact asylees, refugees, or lawful permanent refugees. See 8 U.S.C.
§ 1225(b)(1)(C) (2012).
126. See generally id. § 1225 (including in title “expedited removal of inadmissible arriving
aliens”).
127. Id. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i).
128. See AM. IMMIGRATION COUNCIL, ET AL., EXPEDITED REMOVAL: WHAT HAS CHANGED
SINCE EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 13767, BORDER SECURITY AND IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT
IMPROVEMENTS (2017), https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/sites/default/files/practice_advisory/final_expedited_removal_advisory-_updated_2-21-17.pdf.
129. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i).
130. Id. § 1225(b).

2020]

REGULATING THE BORDER

393

States; 131 (2) individuals interdicted by sea without being admitted or paroled, who have been in the United States for less than two years; 132 and (3)
individuals apprehended within 100 miles of a land border within fourteen
days of entering the country, who have not been admitted or paroled.133 More
recently, the Trump Administration has expanded expedited removal to the
fullest extent of law, applying it to inadmissible individuals in the United
States for less than two years. 134
Importantly, expedited removal contains critical protections for asylum
seekers, implementing screening provisions for those who express a desire to
seek asylum or a fear of return to their home countries. When encountered
by immigration officials, such individuals must be referred for a “credible
fear interview.” 135 If an asylum seeker passes the interview, they will then
be permitted to pursue their asylum claims in a full merits hearing before an
immigration judge. 136 If the asylum seeker fails the screening interview, they
may request de novo review by an immigration judge—who, unlike the asylum officer, is an immigration generalist rather than a refugee specialist. 137
However, that review hearing does not incorporate the full panoply of procedural protections of a regular removal hearing. 138 There is no further review
of the credible fear decision authorized by statute, except for a limited habeas
inquiry. 139 If an applicant fails at the immigration judge review stage, DHS
will quickly return them to their home country. 140

131. Inspection and Expedited Removal of Aliens; Detention and Removal of Aliens; Conduct
of Removal Proceedings; Asylum Procedures, 62 Fed. Reg. 10,312 (Mar. 6, 1997); see also 8 C.F.R.
§ 1.2 (2019) (defining “arriving aliens” as “an applicant for admission coming or attempting to
come into the United States at a port-of-entry, or an alien seeking transit through the United States
at a port-of-entry, or an alien interdicted in international or United States waters and brought into
the United States by any means, whether or not to a designated port-of-entry, and regardless of the
means of transport”).
132. Notice Designating Aliens Subject to Expedited Removal Under Section 235(b)(1)(a)(iii)
of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 67 Fed. Reg. 68,924 (Nov. 12, 2002).
133. Designating Aliens For Expedited Removal, 69 Fed. Reg. 48,877 (Aug. 11, 2004).
134. See Designating Aliens for Expedited Removal, 84 Fed. Reg. 35,409 (July 22, 2019); Border Security and Immigration Enforcement Improvements, 82 Fed. Reg. 8793, 8795–96 (Jan. 25,
2017).
135. See 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(ii), (b)(1)(B); 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.30, 235.3(b)(4) (2019).
136. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii), 1229a(b)(4).
137. 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.30(g), 1208.30(g)(2).
138. See 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii)(III); 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.30(g), 1208.30(g)(2).
139. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.30(g)(2)(IV)(A).
140. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(e). This provision permits judicial review of individual expedited
removal orders for only a narrow subset of issues:
Judicial review of any determination made under section 1225(b)(1) . . . is available
in habeas corpus proceedings, but shall be limited to determinations of—
(A) whether the petitioner is an alien,
(B) whether the petitioner was ordered removed under [§1225(b)(1)], and
(C) whether the petitioner can prove . . . that the petitioner is [a lawful permanent resident], has been admitted as a refugee . . . or has been granted asylum . . . .
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Although curtailed in nature, Congress designed the credible fear process to ensure the United States complies with international legal obligations
to refugees. It expressly incorporated a lower standard for credible fear interviews than for full asylum eligibility, 141 providing that an individual
should pass the screening as long as they have a “significant possibility” of
eligibility for asylum. 142
The legislative history confirms an intention to ensure bona fide asylum
seekers’ access to protection. The Judiciary Committee report to the House
version of the bill explained that:
Under this system, there should be no danger that an alien with
a genuine asylum claim will be returned to persecution. The initial
screening, which should take place in the form of a confidential
interview, will focus on two questions: is the alien telling the truth;
and does the alien have some characteristic that would qualify the
alien as a refugee. As in other cases, the asylum officer should
attempt to elicit all facts relevant to the applicant’s claim. 143
Senator Hatch, a principal sponsor of the Senate bill, described the credible
fear interview as governed by a low screening standard. He explained:
The credible fear standard applied at the screening stage would
be whether, taking into account the alien’s credibility, there is a
significant possibility that the alien would be eligible for asylum.
The Senate bill had provided for a determination of whether the
asylum claim was “manifestly unfounded,” while the House bill
applied a “significant possibility” standard coupled with an inquiry
into whether there was a substantial likelihood that the alien’s
statements were true. The conference report struck a compromise
by rejecting the higher standard of credibility included in the House
bill. The standard adopted in the conference report is intended to

Id. § 1252(e)(2). In Castro v. United States Department of Homeland Security, the Third Circuit
ruled that this provision prohibited review of an underlying credible fear decision and that such
prohibition did not violate the Suspension Clause. 835 F.3d 422 (3d Cir. 2016). The Ninth Circuit
recently reached the opposite conclusion on the constitutional issue, holding that the provision violated the Suspension Clause. Thuraissigiam v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 917 F.3d 1097, 1119 (9th
Cir. 2019) (“[W]e hold that § 1252(e)(2) violates the Suspension Clause as applied to Thuraissigiam, although we do not profess to decide in this opinion what right or rights Thuraissigiam may
vindicate via use of the writ.”). The Supreme Court, however, granted certiorari in Thuraissigiam,
which remains pending before it. Dep't of Homeland Sec. v. Thuraissigiam, 140 S. Ct. 427 (2019).
141. See generally 8 U.S.C. § 1158.
142. Id. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(v) (defining “credible fear of persecution” as “a significant possibility,
taking into account the credibility of the statements made by the alien in support of the alien’s claim
and such other facts as are known to the officer, that the alien could establish eligibility for asylum
under section 1158 of this title”).
143. H.R. REP. NO. 104-469, at 158 (1996) (emphasis added); see also H.R. REP. NO. 104-828,
at 36 (1996) (Conf. Rep.).
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be a low screening standard for admission into the usual full asylum process. 144
Although the selection of a “significant possibility” standard reflects a
higher threshold than one that screens out only “manifestly unfounded”
claims, the credible fear standard was explicitly designed to be “low”: ensuring that individuals who could eventually establish asylum eligibility would
be allowed a full adjudication of their claims in regular removal proceedings.
As mentioned above, the well-founded fear standard for full asylum eligibility itself requires only a one in ten chance of persecution, rendering a significant possibility of a well-founded fear quite minimal. 145
The DHS has also recognized credible fear as involving a low screening
threshold in agency guidance and official documents. 146 In issuing interim
rules for the implementation of IIRIRA, the then-Immigration and Naturalization Service (“INS”) and Executive Office of Immigration Review characterized the credible fear standard as “set[ting] a low threshold of proof of
potential entitlement to asylum”—recognizing that many individuals “who
have passed the credible fear standard will not ultimately be granted asylum.” 147 As understood by the agency at the time, the standard would
properly function to favor screening any individuals with a bona fide claim,
even if allowing “many” to apply for asylum who are ultimately denied.
Senator Hatch further explained that the structure of asylum screening
at the border, conducted by trained and specialized asylum officers under supervisory guidance, would prevent the possibility of erroneous decisionmaking:
Under the conference report, screening would be done by fullytrained asylum officers supervised by officers who have not only
had comparable training but have also had substantial experience
adjudicating asylum applications. This should prevent the potential that was in the terrorism bill provisions for erroneous decisions
by lower level immigration officials at points of entry. 148

144. 142 CONG. REC. 25,347 (1996) (emphasis added).
145. Immigration & Naturalization Servs. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 440 (1987).
146. Inspection and Expedited Removal of Aliens; Detention and Removal of Aliens; Conduct
of Removal Proceedings; Asylum Procedures, 62 Fed. Reg. 10,312, 10,320 (Mar. 6, 1997) (stating
that credible fear is “a low threshold of proof of potential entitlement to asylum,” the purpose of
which is to ensure access to a full hearing for all individuals who have such potential entitlement).
United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”) Guidance previously also recognized that Congress meant for a significant possibility to be “a low screening standard for admission
into the usual full asylum process.” U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., ASYLUM OFFICER
BASIC TRAINING COURSE PARTICIPANT WORKBOOK: CREDIBLE FEAR 11 (2006).
147. Inspection and Expedited Removal of Aliens; Detention and Removal of Aliens; Conduct
of Removal Proceedings; Asylum Procedures, 62 Fed. Reg. 10,312, 10,320.
148. 142 CONG. REC. 25,347 (1996).
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In the final version of the statute, Congress took the effort both to require that screenings be conducted by an asylum officer, 149 and to define that
term for the first time. The expedited removal statute itself specifies that:
As used in this paragraph, the term “asylum officer” means an
immigration officer who—
(i) has had professional training in country conditions, asylum
law, and interview techniques comparable to that provided to fulltime adjudicators of applications under section 1158 of this title,
and
(ii) is supervised by an officer who meets the condition described
in clause (i) and has had substantial experience adjudicating asylum applications. 150
The statutory text thus mandates an adjudicating official with specialized training in not only substantive law but also background country conditions of refugee-sending countries and interviewing techniques. Moreover,
it specifies that these officers be supervised by trained officers with a body
of experience adjudicating asylum claims. These features likely render the
Trump Administration’s current plan to have Customs and Border Protection
(“CBP”) conduct screenings illegal, as described in the following section,
which also explores the history and structure of the asylum office.
C. Structure of Asylum Decisionmaking at the Border and Beyond
As Senator Hatch stressed, the current scheme places credible fear adjudications under the auspices of specially trained asylum officers. The asylum office was established in 1990 via regulations implementing the 1980
Refugee Act. 151 Those regulations took affirmative asylum cases (those filed
by individuals not in proceedings) away from general INS examiners who
had adjudicated a range of immigrant benefits, giving them instead to asylum
specialists. 152 The regulations also ensured that immigration judges would
continue to hear asylum and withholding claims of individuals in proceedings. 153

149. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(i) (2012) (“An asylum officer shall conduct interviews of aliens
referred under subparagraph (A)(ii), either at a port of entry or at such other place designated by the
Attorney General.”).
150. Id. § 1225(b)(1)(E).
151. See Aliens and Nationality; Asylum and Withholding of Deportation Procedures, 55 Fed.
Reg. 30,674, 30,676 (Jul. 27, 1990). In formal documents, the office is referred to as the Asylum
Division, but I use the more common phrase “asylum office” throughout this article.
152. Id.; see also Margaret H. Taylor, Refugee Roulette in an Administrative Law Context: The
Déjà Vu of Decisional Disparities in Agency Adjudication, 60 STAN. L. REV. 475, 482–83 (2007).
153. Aliens and Nationality; Asylum and Withholding of Deportation Procedures, 55 Fed. Reg.
at 30,675.
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The 1980 Refugee Act enacted the core refugee definition and a structure for adjudication of overseas refugee claims; 154 however, it gave little
guidance on the process for hearing asylum claims in the United States. The
1990 regulations reflected ten years of debate, during which the then-INS 155
considered many differing visions for the proper adjudication system, including both adversarial and non-adversarial models. As the agency explained,
the creation of a non-adversarial and specialized corps reflected “[a] fundamental belief that the granting of asylum is inherently a humanitarian act distinct from the normal operation and administration of the immigration process; and a recognition of the essential need for an orderly and fair system
for the adjudication of asylum claims.” 156 Although the 1980 Refugee Act
itself did not mandate creation of the asylum corps, in 1996 Congress formalized the corps’ existence via IIRIRA, which required that asylum officers
conduct credible fear interviews. 157
In 2003, pursuant to the Homeland Security Act, the asylum corps became part of U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”) within
the newly created DHS. 158 Officers in the corps specialize in asylum claims
and hear them exclusively. They need not be attorneys—although many
are—and all officers receive an intensive course and ongoing weekly training
on a range of issues. 159 Training topics include substantive law, procedure,
country conditions, and interviewing techniques specific to refugees. 160 A
resource information bank allows officers ready access to information about
human rights conditions throughout the world. 161

154. See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
155. The INS was dissolved in 2003. Most of its functions are now carried out by the USCIS,
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”), and the U.S. Customs and Border Protection
(“CBP”). See Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107–296, 116 Stat. 2135, 2195–96; see
also Did You Know?: The INS No Longer Exists, USCIS: BEACON (Apr. 13, 2011),
https://www.uscis.gov/archive/blog/2011/04/did-you-know-ins-no-longer-exists.
156. Aliens and Nationality; Asylum and Withholding of Deportation Procedures, 55 Fed. Reg.
at 30,675.
157. See supra notes 149–150 and accompanying text.
158. Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107–296, 116 Stat. 2135, 2195–96.
159. Stephen Paskey, Telling Refugee Stories: Trauma, Credibility, and the Adversarial Adjudication of Claims for Asylum, 56 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 457, 468 (2016); Heidi Boas, Tips from a
Former Asylum Officer, ASYLUMIST (Mar. 25, 2018), https://www.asylumist.com/2018/03/21/tipsfrom-a-former-asylum-officer (last visited Feb. 4, 2019) (“Asylum officers are required to undergo
an extensive six-week training program in asylum law, and pass exams before adjudicating asylum
cases. In addition, they continue receiving weekly training throughout their tenure at the asylum
office.”).
160. See Boas, supra note 159; see also Doris Meissner et al., The U.S. Asylum System in Crisis:
Charting a Way Forward, MIGRATION POL’Y INST. (2018), https://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/us-asylum-system-crisis-charting-way-forward.
161. See Boas, supra note 159.
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The office hears asylum merits applications received through the affirmative process, in addition to conducting credible fear interviews for individuals in expedited removal. It does not handle defensive applications—that
is, those filed by individuals in removal proceedings. 162 Eight asylum office
jurisdictions adjudicate claims throughout the United States, with most offices serving several states. 163 In 2018, the asylum office received over
99,000 credible fear case referrals,164 up from 5047 in 2008. 165 In 2017, the
office also received nearly 140,000 affirmative applications. 166 If the asylum
office declines to grant a merits case and the applicant is out of status, the
office refers the case to the immigration courts, where the individual will
have a chance to apply for asylum again in defensive posture.167
Despite the considerable adjudicatory experience and expertise of the
asylum corps, their decisions—even for full merits cases—do not result in
legal precedent. Rather than placing precedent decisional authority within
162. 8 C.F.R. § 208.2(a)(b) (2019) (setting forth jurisdiction of asylum office over applications
for asylum by individuals not in removal proceedings and of immigration court over applicants who
have been served with a notice to appear in immigration court or related document); see also Obtaining Asylum in the United States, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVICES (Oct. 19, 2015),
https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/refugees-asylum/asylum/obtaining-asylum-united-states (describing difference between affirmative and defensive asylum applications). Of note, the asylum
office also lacks jurisdiction over merits cases of individuals with reinstated prior removal orders,
that is, individuals who unlawfully entered the United States after having been issued a removal
order, including an expedited removal order. See 8 C.F.R. § 208.2(c)(2). The DHS can only reinstate prior orders for individuals who unlawfully enter; not those who present at ports of entry. 8
U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5) (2012); 8 C.F.R. § 241.8. If such individuals are apprehended by immigration
authorities after unlawful entry and claim a fear of return to their home country, they receive a
“reasonable fear interview” rather than a credible fear interview—a screening interview for threshold eligibility for withholding of removal or Convention Against Torture (“CAT”) protection. If
they pass, they are placed into “withholding only” proceedings before an immigration judge in
which they can apply for withholding of removal and protection under CAT, but not asylum. See
Ramirez-Mejia v. Lynch, 794 F.3d 485 (5th Cir. 2015).
163. See USCIS Service and Office Locator, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVICES,
https://egov.uscis.gov/office-locator/ (last visited Jan. 29, 2020). The offices are Arlington, VA;
Chicago, IL; Houston, TX; Los Angeles, CA; Miami, FL; New York, NY; Newark, NJ; and San
Francisco, CA. Id.
164. U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., CREDIBLE FEAR WORKLOAD REPORT
SUMMARY
(2018),
https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/Outreach/PED_CFandRFstats09302018.pdf.
165. Credible Fear Cases Completed and Referrals for Credible Fear Interview, U.S.
CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVICES, https://www.dhs.gov/immigration-statistics/readingroom/RFA/credible-fear-cases-interview (last updated Apr. 29, 2019).
166. OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., ANNUAL FLOW
REPORT: REFUGEES AND ASYLEES: 2017, at 7 (2019), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/Refugees_Asylees_2017.pdf.
167. ASYLUM DIV., U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., AFFIRMATIVE ASYLUM
PROCEDURES MANUAL 26 (2016), https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/Humanitarian/Refugees%20%26%20Asylum/Asylum/AAPM-2016.pdf (“The
Asylum Office must refer to the Immigration Court for adjudication in removal proceedings an
applicant who is ineligible to apply for or be granted asylum and appears inadmissible or deportable at the time the decision is issued.”).
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the asylum office or elsewhere in DHS, the immigration laws provide that
the “determination and ruling by the Attorney General with respect to all
questions of law shall be controlling.” 168 The precedent asylum decisions of
the BIA and the Attorney General, arising from “defensive claims” raised in
removal proceedings, apply to asylum officers in merits adjudications—and,
as described in more detail in Section V.B. below, have also been applied in
credible fear proceedings.
The BIA, created in 1940, is a delegatee of the Attorney General.169 The
BIA hears appeals from immigration judge decisions and may decide those
appeals and may issue precedent decisions. 170 Although regulations charge
the BIA with providing “clear and uniform guidance to the Service, the immigration judges, and the general public,” 171 the Attorney General can also
override the BIA via a certification process. Namely, under 8 C.F.R.
§ 1003.1(h), the Attorney General has authority to direct the BIA to refer its
cases to them for their own adjudication. 172 Finally, the United States Courts
of Appeals review removal decisions of both the Attorney General and the
BIA. 173
In 2019, the Trump Administration announced and implemented a new
policy allowing CBP agents to conduct credible fear interviews. 174 Such action likely runs afoul of statutory language, intent, and design—which as ex-

168. 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(1) (2012). The Homeland Security Act of 2002 (“HSA”) created the
Department of Homeland Security and transferred to it immigration functions previously within the
Department of Justice including enforcement and benefits. See Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135
(2002). However, the Act specifically provided for the Attorney General to retain:
[S]uch authorities and functions under this chapter and all other laws relating to the immigration and naturalization of aliens as were exercised by the Executive Office for Immigration Review, or by the Attorney General with respect to the Executive Office for
Immigration Review, on the day before the effective date of the [HSA].
8 U.S.C. § 1103(g)(1).
169. Regulations Governing Departmental Organization and Authority, 5 Fed. Reg. 3502, 3503
(Sept. 4, 1940); Stephen H. Legomsky, Learning to Live with Unequal Justice: Asylum and the
Limits to Consistency, 60 STAN. L. REV. 413, 461 (2007) (“[W]hen the BIA decides a case, it is
acting as an agent of the Attorney General.”).
170. See 8 C.F.R. §1003.1 (2019).
171. See id. §1003.1(d)(1).
172. Id. §1003.1(h).
173. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1), (5).
174. See Memorandum on Additional Measures to Enhance Border Security and Restore Integrity to Our Immigration System, 2019 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1–2 (Apr. 29, 2019); HUMAN
RIGHTS FIRST, ALLOWING CBP TO CONDUCT CREDIBLE FEAR INTERVIEWS UNDERMINES
SAFEGUARDS TO PROTECT REFUGEES (2019), https://www.humanrightsfirst.org/sites/default/files/CBP_Credible_Fear.pdf (concluding CBP officers are not equipped to conduct screening
of asylum seekers, and that such action would violate regulation); Molly O’Toole, Border Patrol
Agents, Rather Than Asylum Officers, Interviewing Families for “Credible Fear,” L.A. TIMES
(Sept. 19, 2019, 5:50 AM), https://www.latimes.com/politics/story/2019-09-19/border-patrol-interview-migrant-families-credible-fear (reporting on implementation of CBP credible fear interviews).
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plained above, require that specialized, trained, and experienced asylum officers conduct screenings. 175 Despite the administration’s rushed attempt to
provide training to CBP agents, 176 the agency’s enforcement-orientation and
documented record of abuses against migrants render it ill-suited to conduct
non-adversarial and sensitive screenings. 177 This is especially so given practical limitations and challenges in border screenings, explored below.
D. Practical Limitations in Asylum Adjudication via Expedited
Removal
The low screening threshold in expedited removal, properly construed,
takes into consideration structural and practical limits presented in screening
interviews. Although trained asylum officers conduct credible fear interviews, they do so in constrained and chaotic conditions. Many interviews
take place telephonically, with no ability for the adjudicator and the applicant
to establish in-person rapport. 178 The interviews are not recorded, and interpretation problems plague the process, such that asylum seekers often receive
inadequate or no interpretation in their primary language. 179 Moreover, regulations provide no guarantee of participation by attorneys, even for individuals lucky enough to secure counsel within days of making it to the United
States. Rather, regulations state only that attorneys provided at no cost to the
government “may” be present at interviews. 180 In curtailed review hearings
of cases in which the asylum officer finds no credible fear, immigration
judges also often limit the role of attorneys, as an immigration court policy
manual expressly denies a right to counsel to credible fear applicants. 181

175. See supra note 174; see also supra Section I.E.
176. See Yegenah Torbati, et. al., U.S. Will Assign Dozens of Border Agents to Migrant Asylum
Interviews, REUTERS (May 9, 2019, 6:09 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-immigration/u-s-will-assign-dozens-of-border-agents-to-migrant-asylum-interviews-idUSKCN1SF2N0.
177. See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, supra note 174, at 2 (“Border Patrol agents have repeatedly used excessive force in encounters with migrants, threatened unaccompanied children, and
some have pressured refugees who have crossed the border to not apply for asylum. . . . Some CBP
officers have openly expressed skepticism of asylum claims . . . .”).
178. INTER-AMERICAN COMM’N ON HUMAN RIGHTS, REFUGEES AND MIGRANTS IN THE
UNITED STATES: FAMILIES AND UNACCOMPANIED CHILDREN 68–69
(2015),
https://www.oas.org/en/iachr/reports/pdfs/Refugees-Migrants-US.pdf.
179. See, e.g., COMM’N ON IMMIGRATION, AM. BAR ASS’N, FAMILY IMMIGRATION
DETENTION: WHY THE PAST CANNOT BE PROLOGUE 38 (2015), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/immigration/FamilyDetentionReport2015.pdf; HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST,
FAMILY DETENTION: STILL HAPPENING, STILL DAMAGING 11–12 (2015), http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/sites/default/files/HRF-family-detention-still-happening.pdf.
180. 8 C.F.R. § 208.30(d)(4) (2019) (stating that attorneys “may be present at the interview and
may be permitted, in the discretion of the asylum officer, to present a statement at the end of the
interview”).
181. A policy memorandum states that “[t]here is no right to representation prior to or during
the [credible fear] review.” MICHAEL J. CREPPY, EXEC. OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, U.S.
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, INTERIM OPERATING POLICY AND PROCEDURE MEMORANDUM 97-3:
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As scholars and commentators have noted, the above conditions impede
the ability of individuals to present their claims. 182 The structural limitations
of the interview itself are compounded by detention of individuals throughout
expedited removal proceedings. Immigration and Customs Enforcement
(“ICE”) keeps both families and adult asylum seekers detained during credible fear processes in jail-like conditions that pose a risk to both physical and
mental health. 183 Asylum seekers, moreover, often experience extreme deprivation, sexual abuse, and physical violence during their migration journeys,
and many suffer trauma from past persecution. 184
Despite these documented issues, the Trump Administration has sought
to expand these curtailed processes to their furthest reach. 185 As I argue in
Part VI below, structural and practical limitations of expedited removal
should inform implementation of the credible fear standard. But first, I turn
to the framework for judicial review of agency decisionmaking in the next
Part.
III. DOMESTIC VIOLENCE-BASED ASYLUM: AN OVERVIEW
Since the passage of the Refugee Act, both DOJ and DHS have articulated official positions on the viability of asylum claims based on domestic
violence. Whereas DOJ’s views have varied widely, DHS has expressed
largely consistent official recognitions of these claims. I delve into the views
of each agency below.
PROCEDURES FOR CREDIBLE FEAR AND CLAIMED STATUS REVIEWS 10 (1997), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/eoir/legacy/2013/05/07/97-3.pdf.
182. See, e.g., Michele R. Pistone and John J. Hoeffner, Rules Are Made to Be Broken: How the
Process of Expedited Removal Fails Asylum Seekers, 20 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 167 (2006); COMM’N
ON IMMIGRATION, AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 179, at 38.
183. Reports documenting human rights abuses in ICE detention centers are legion. See, e.g.,
AMNESTY INT’L, JAILED WITHOUT JUSTICE: IMMIGRATION DETENTION IN THE USA (2009),
https://www.amnestyusa.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/03/JailedWithoutJustice.pdf; DET. WATCH
NETWORK, EXPOSE AND CLOSE: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY (2012), https://www.detentionwatchnetwork.org/pressroom/reports/2012/expose-and-close; HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, U.S. DETENTION OF
ASYLUM SEEKERS: SEEKING PROTECTION, FINDING PRISON (2009), https://www.humanrightsfirst.org/wp-content/uploads/pdf/090429-RP-hrf-asylum-detention-report.pdf;
KAREN
TUMLIN ET AL., A BROKEN SYSTEM: CONFIDENTIAL REPORTS REVEAL FAILURES IN U.S.
IMMIGRATION DETENTION CENTERS (2009), https://www.nilc.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/ABroken-System-2009-07.pdf; U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, WITH LIBERTY AND JUSTICE FOR
ALL: THE STATE OF CIVIL RIGHTS AT IMMIGRATION DETENTION FACILITIES (2015),
https://www.usccr.gov/pubs/docs/Statutory_Enforcement_Report2015.pdf; US: Deaths in ImmiHUM.
RTS.
WATCH
(July
7,
2016,
12:00
AM),
gration
Detention,
https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/07/07/us-deaths-immigration-detention.
184. See U.S. COMM’N ON INT’L RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, REPORT ON ASYLUM SEEKERS IN
EXPEDITED REMOVAL, VOLUME I: FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 60–61, 68–69 (2005),
https://www.uscirf.gov/sites/default/files/resources/stories/pdf/asylum_seekers/Volume_I.pdf.
185. See supra note 134 and accompanying text (explaining expanded application of expedited
removal to inadmissible individuals in the United States for less than two years, irrespective of
geographic location of apprehension).
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A. DOJ Position Through the Years
In the years following the passage of the Refugee Act, the Department
of Justice began to recognize—albeit in fits and starts—the legitimacy of asylum protections for women seeking asylum from gender-based persecution. 186 It has approved these claims largely but not exclusively by finding
persecution on account of particular social group, which is one of the five
grounds for asylum along with race, religion, nationality, and political opinion. Indeed, in defining particular social group for the first time in Matter of
Acosta, 187 the BIA in 1985 explained that “sex” could be a defining characteristic that met its newly-articulated standard for social group. 188 That test
required the group to be defined around fundamental or immutable characteristics that an applicant either could not change or should not be forced to
change.
In Matter of Kasinga, 189 the BIA in 1996 held for the first time that a
woman could establish asylum protections for gender-based harms, granting
asylum to a young woman from Togo fleeing female genital cutting
(“FGC”). 190 The BIA held the practice of FGC against a woman’s will constituted persecution, and recognized a social group rooted in gender, nationality, tribal membership, and opposition to the practice. It also held that the
record established the harm was on account of her membership in the proposed social group, based on evidence of societal context and gendered social
norms. 191
In 1999, however, the BIA denied protection to Rody Alvarado Peña, a
Guatemalan survivor of domestic violence who also raised a gender-based
asylum claim. 192 The BIA there issued a divided precedent decision, Matter
of R-A-, 193 reversing the immigration judge’s grant of asylum. 194 Ms. Alvarado had suffered years of physical, emotional, and sexual violence by her
husband, which she claimed was based on her gender, her relationship status,
and the gendered beliefs of her persecutor. 195 The BIA did not question that

186. See generally Karen Musalo, A Short History of Gender Asylum in the United States: Resistance and Ambivalence May Very Slowly Be Inching Towards Recognition of Women’s Claims,
29 REFUGEE SURV. Q. 46 (2010) (discussing the development of domestic violence-based asylum
in the United States).
187. 19 I. & N. Dec. 211 (B.I.A. 1985).
188. Id. at 233.
189. 21 I. & N. Dec. 357 (B.I.A. 1996).
190. Id. at 358.
191. Id. at 365–68.
192. See Matter of R-A-, CTR FOR GENDER & REFUGEE STUD., https://cgrs.uchastings.edu/ourwork/matter-r-a- (last visited Feb. 20, 2020) (explaining case background and identifying Ms. Alvarado).
193. R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 906 (B.I.A. 1999).
194. Id.
195. Id. at 908–910.
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the abuse she suffered was horrific or severe. It ruled, however, that Ms.
Alvarado failed to establish persecution on account of membership in a particular social group. 196 Specifically, it rejected the proposed group of “Guatemalan women who have been involved intimately with Guatemalan male
companions, who believe that women are to live under male domination”—
accepted by the immigration judge below—because the group was not “recognized and understood to be a societal faction.” 197 It also held that Ms.
Alvarado did not show nexus to—or persecution “on account of”—her membership in this social group. 198
Matter of R-A- drew immediate criticism and resulted in a series of
agency actions. 199 In 2000, the DOJ under Attorney General Janet Reno issued proposed regulations to address claims such as Ms. Alvarado’s. 200 A
long background section discussed the viability of gender-based asylum and
the DOJ’s disagreement with the BIA in R-A-. The DOJ explained that the
proposed rule was designed to “remove[] certain barriers that the [Matter of]
R-A- decision seems to pose to claims that domestic violence, against which
a government is either unwilling or unable to provide protection, rises to the
level of persecution of a person on account of membership in a particular
social group.” 201 After issuing the proposed regulations, Attorney General
Reno in 2001 certified the BIA’s decision to herself and vacated it, remanding back to the BIA with instructions to stay the case while regulations remained pending. 202
Regulations, however, never issued under Attorney General Reno’s
watch, and in 2003, Attorney General John Ashcroft intervened and ordered
the parties to brief the case. 203 Rather than issuing a decision, he sent it back
to the BIA in 2005, with instructions to reconsider the case under final regulations when they issued. To date, however, no regulations have issued, 204
and in 2008, Attorney General Mukasey vacated the stay and ordered the BIA

196. Id. at 918–19.
197. Id. at 918.
198. The BIA also rejected Ms. Alvarado’s claim of asylum based on political opinion. See id.
at 916–17.
199. See Musalo, supra note 186, at 58.
200. Asylum and Withholding Definitions, 65 Fed. Reg. 76,588 (Dec. 7, 2000).
201. Id. at.76,589. The DOJ noted that rather than attempt a “universal model for persecution
claims based on domestic violence,” it has instead opted for a rule that states “generally applicable
principles that will allow for case-by-case adjudication of claims based on domestic violence.” Id.
202. R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 906.
203. See R-A-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 629, 629 (A.G. 2008) (“On February 21, 2003, Attorney General
Ashcroft certified the Board’s decision for review but remanded the case on January 19, 2005, again
directing the Board to reconsider its decision ‘in light of the final rule.’” (quoting R-A-, 23 I. & N.
Dec. 694 (A.G. 2005)).
204. The Obama Administration did state its intent to issue new proposed regulations in 2010
but failed to do so. See Regulatory Plan, 74 Fed. Reg. 64,137 (Dec. 7, 2009); Asylum and Withholding Definition, 74 Fed. Reg. 64,220, 64,220–21 (Dec. 7, 2009).
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to reconsider the case. 205 The BIA remanded to the immigration judge, and
in 2009, the immigration judge granted asylum to Ms. Alvarado after both
parties stipulated to a grant. 206 Thus, Ms. Alvarado’s case was favorably resolved after almost a decade, but with no guiding precedent for agency adjudicators.
Finally, in 2014 the BIA issued a precedent decision, Matter of A-R-CG-, 207 providing guidance on the viability of domestic violence asylum
claims. 208 The BIA in A-R-C-G- recognized a social group of “married
women in Guatemala who are unable to leave their relationship.” 209 As in
Kasinga, the BIA examined social and cultural context in assessing the
group. It applied its newly articulated three-part test for social group—developed in 2014 to require that a group be “particular” and “socially distinct”
in addition to immutable or fundamental. 210 In considering these new prongs,
the BIA cited “societal expectations about gender and subordination” and a
culture of “machismo and family violence” in Guatemala.211 Matter of A-RC-G- was thus a clear acknowledgement of the gender dynamics of persecution against women, including in intimate partnerships and within a family
home.
B. DHS Position Through the Years
Although DHS originally opposed the grant of asylum to Ms. Alvarado
before the BIA in 1999, since the mid-2000s DHS has taken an overall consistent official position before the BIA and Attorney General recognizing the
viability of domestic violence asylum claims. In its 2005 briefing before Attorney General Ashcroft, DHS argued that Ms. Alvarado had in fact established asylum eligibility under the immigration laws, changing its prior position in her case. 212 In a 2009 BIA case called Matter of L-R-, DHS
headquarters submitted a supplemental brief, requested by the BIA to specifically address domestic violence asylum claims. DHS argued that the BIA
could accept as cognizable either the particular social group of “Mexican
205. R-A-, 24 I. & N. at 629.
206. See A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 388, 391–92 n.12 (B.I.A. 2014) (“In remanded proceedings,
the parties stipulated that [Ms. Alvarado] was eligible for asylum. Her application was granted on
December 10, 2009.”).
207. 26 I. & N. Dec. 388 (B.I.A. 2014).
208. Id. at 391–92 & n.12.
209. Id. at 389.
210. Id. at 390–92.
211. Id. at 393–94 (noting that “married woman’s inability to leave the relationship may be
informed by societal expectations about gender and subordination, as well as legal constraints regarding divorce and separation” and that “the record in this case includes unrebutted evidence that
Guatemala has a culture of ‘machismo and family violence’”).
212. Brief for DHS on Respondent’s Eligibility for Relief at 2, R-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 694 (A.G.
2005) (No. A 73 753 922), http://cgrs.uchastings.edu/sites/default/files/Matter%20of%20R-A%20DHS%20brief.pdf.
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women in domestic relationships who are unable to leave” or “Mexican
women who are viewed as property by virtue of their positions within a domestic relationship.” 213 And in Matter of A-R-C-G-, DHS similarly argued
that the proposed social group rooted in gender, nationality, and relationship
status—“married women in Guatemala who are unable to leave their relationship”—was cognizable. 214
Agency guidance also confirms the Department’s position on the viability of domestic violence claims, even prior to Matter of Kasinga and Matter
of R-A-. A May 1995 guidance memorandum addressed to all asylum offices
within INS instructed that “rape (including mass rape in, for example, Bosnia), sexual abuse and domestic violence, infanticide and genital mutilation
are forms of mistreatment primarily directed at girls and women and they
may serve as evidence of past persecution on account of one or more of the
five grounds.” 215 More recent asylum officer training course materials have
further elaborated on the viability of these claims. For example, December
2002 training guidance, citing to the 1995 INS guidelines, explains that domestic violence claimants can meet various elements of asylum eligibility,
including harm rising to the level of persecution, particular social group, and
nexus. 216
C. Court Decisions Through the Years
The United States Courts of Appeals did not have the opportunity to
apply Chevron to Matter of A-R-C-G- prior to the BIA decision’s vacatur and
reversal by former Attorney General Sessions. 217 In several cases, however,
the courts reviewed the agency’s application of Matter of A-R-C-G- in domestic violence asylum cases. In so doing, the federal courts upheld and
reversed denials of domestic-violence-based asylum in cases that the agency
213. Supplemental Brief for DHS at 14, L-R- (B.I.A. Apr. 13, 2009), https://cgrs.uchastings.edu/sites/default/files/Matter_of_LR_DHS_Brief_4_13_2009.pdf.
214. A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 390 (“DHS now concedes the respondent established that she
suffered past harm rising to the level of persecution and that the persecution was on account of a
particular social group comprised of ‘married women in Guatemala who are unable to leave their
relationship.’”).
215. PHYLLIS COVEN, OFFICE OF INT’L AFFAIRS, DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CONSIDERATIONS FOR
ASYLUM OFFICERS ADJUDICATING ASYLUM CLAIMS FROM WOMEN (1995), reprinted in 7 INT’L J.
REFUGEE L. 700, 703–04 (1995) (emphasis added).
216. U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., ASYLUM OFFICER BASIC TRAINING COURSE
PARTICIPANT WORKBOOK: FEMALE ASYLUM APPLICANTS AND GENDER-RELATED CLAIMS
(2002).
217. Notably, in asylum and withholding appeals to federal circuit courts brought by individual
petitioners, the DOJ Office of Immigration Litigation represents the agency itself, and thus defends
the decisions of the BIA. See Office of Immigration Litigation, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST.,
https://www.justice.gov/civil/office-immigration-litigation (last updated Oct. 20, 2014). Asylum
applicant petitioners raising domestic violence asylum claims, meanwhile, had an interest in challenging the application of Matter of A-R-C-G- to deny them protection, but not the validity of Matter
of A-R-C-G- itself.
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had deemed distinguishable from Matter of A-R-C-G-. In an unpublished
Ninth Circuit case, for example, the applicant raised an A-R-C-G--type social
group of Honduran women in a relationship they are unable to leave. The
BIA had held that the applicant was in fact able to leave her relationship;
however, the circuit court reversed, determining that the BIA’s conclusion
was not supported by substantial evidence in light of the abuser’s continuing
violence and stalking. 218 In a published Sixth Circuit case, the court reached
the opposite conclusion on a similar issue, upholding the agency’s determination that the petitioner was able to leave her relationship because she
moved freely about her country and avoided her abuser. 219
Outside the intimate partner violence context, the courts have recognized the viability of a range of gender-based asylum claims, including other
forms of persecution that take place within a family home. In doing so, federal courts have analyzed the underlying gender norms that cause and enable
persecution. In Sarhan v. Holder, 220 for example, the Seventh Circuit examined the gendered societal context of “honor killings” of women by their family members under the particular social group ground, concluding that:
The social group in this case . . . is a function of a pre-existing
moral code in Jordanian society . . . . Social stigma causes the violence. Society as a whole brands women who flout its norms as
outcasts, and it delegates to family members the task of meting out
the appropriate punishment—in this case, death. 221
The Seventh Circuit also rejected the agency’s reasoning that the persecutor—the applicant’s brother—acted out of personal motivations, rather
than on account of protected ground:
There is no personal dispute between Disi [the petitioner] and her
brother [Besem]. He has not vowed to kill her because of a quarrel
about whether she or Besem should inherit a parcel of land, or because she did a bad job running his store, or because she broke
Besem’s favorite toy as a child. She faces death because of a
widely-held social norm in Jordan—a norm that imposes behavioral obligations on her and permits Besem to enforce them in the
most drastic way. The dispute between Disi and Besem is simply
a piece of a complex cultural construct that entitles male members
of families dishonored by perceived bad acts of female relatives to
218. Alvarado-Garcia v. Lynch, 665 F. App’x 620, 621 (9th Cir. 2016).
219. Marikasi v. Lynch, 840 F.3d 281, 291 (6th Cir. 2016) (upholding agency denial where
substantial evidence supported the agency’s conclusion that applicant was in fact able to leave her
relationship where there were no continued stalking and abuse, unlike applicant in Matter of A-RC-G-); see also Vega–Ayala v. Lynch, 833 F.3d 34, 39 (1st Cir. 2016) (upholding agency denial of
protection to woman who claimed asylum based on domestic violence but never lived with her
abuser, unlike the applicant in Matter of A-R-C-G-).
220. 658 F.3d 649 (7th Cir. 2011).
221. Id. at 655.
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kill those women. . . . The very fact that these are called “honor
killings” demonstrates that they are killings with broader social
significance. 222
The Seventh Circuit’s analysis wholly rejects any notion that the gender-based persecution of women fails if an applicant has a relationship with
her persecutor. Other circuits have also recognized the viability of honor
killing or forced marriage claims, as well as claims rooted in incest or familial
abuse due to sexual orientation—contexts that inherently involve some relationship of the applicant to her persecutor. 223 And, in Perdomo v. Holder, 224
the Ninth Circuit recognized that a social group based on gender and nationality alone might be cognizable, reversing the agency’s cursory rejection of
the proposed social group of “women in Guatemala.” 225 The court remanded
to the agency for a case-specific assessment of that social group in the context
of the applicant’s fear of femicide, or the gender-motivated killing of
women. 226
These cases demonstrate that the federal courts of appeals do broadly
recognize that persecution of women for being women falls within the scope
of refugee protection. Harms perpetrated by individuals with relational ties
to a woman applicant—be they intimate partners, siblings, or parents—are
not exempted. Yet, as discussed in Part V, the DOJ under President Trump
took on this growing consensus around gender-based refugee protections, using agency interpretive authority in an attempt to reverse course on these
claims.
IV. THE BORDER UNDER PRESIDENT TRUMP: POLITICIZATION AND
CONSTANT CRISIS
The Matter of A-B- decision, which I will discuss in detail shortly, did
not take place in a vacuum. Rather, it was part of a broader narrative adopted
by the Trump Administration of a nation under threat—specifically from asylum seekers at the U.S.-Mexico border. Below, I provide a non-exhaustive
overview of executive actions that overtly politicize the concept of “the border.”
Over December 2017 and January 2018, President Trump caused a government shutdown in an attempt to force Congress to provide $5.7 billion in

222. Id. at 656.
223. Bringas-Rodriguez v. Sessions, 850 F.3d 1051, 1056, 1076 (9th Cir. 2017) (incest committed against gay petitioner); Kamar v. Sessions, 875 F.3d 811, 818 (6th Cir. 2017) (honor killing
claim); Qu v. Holder, 618 F.3d 602, 604, 608 (6th Cir. 2010) (forced marriage claim); Nabulwala
v. Gonzalez, 481 F.3d 1115, 1117–18 (8th Cir. 2007) (familial abuse of lesbian-identified petitioner).
224. 611 F.3d 662 (9th Cir. 2010).
225. Id. at 667–69.
226. Id. at 669.
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funding for his border wall. 227 His brinksmanship failed, and he reopened
the government after a record thirty-five days of closure—during which time
over 380,000 federal workers went without pay. 228 Thousands of federal
workers lined up at food banks and many more struggled to pay medical bills
and rent. 229 In total, the Congressional Budget Office estimated the shutdown
caused $11 billion in lost GDP over two quarters, $3 billion of which will
never be recovered—as well as lasting indirect economic harms. 230 Successful funding negotiations post-shutdown resulted in legislation providing
President Trump with $1.37 billion for his wall, but this was not enough:
President Trump signed the bill, but denounced it as inadequate. 231 On February 15, 2019, he accordingly declared a national emergency in order to divert nearly $7 billion in federal funds, primarily from the Department of Defense, for his wall. 232 Even as litigation against that diversion of funds
continues, 233 the Pentagon recently announced plans to divert an additional
$3.8 billion for the wall. 234
Earlier in fall 2018, President Trump attempted to ban individuals from
asylum eligibility if they crossed unlawfully into territory between ports of

227. Julie Hirschfeld Davis & Emily Cochrane, Government Shuts Down as Talks Fail to Break
Impasse, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 21, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/21/us/politics/trumpshutdown-border-wall.html. Although the House passed a bill for continuing three weeks of funding for the government, President Trump’s stated refusal to sign a bill without the requested border
wall funding derailed its passage in the Senate, as Senate Leader Mitch McConnell refused to bring
a funding bill to vote without President Trump’s approval. See id.
228. See Bob Bryan, The Government Shutdown Is in Day 35 and Has Shattered the Record for
the Longest Shutdown in History, BUS. INSIDER (Jan. 25, 2019, 11:52 AM), https://www.businessinsider.com/history-of-government-shutdowns-in-congress-2018-1.
229. Ian Stewart, As Shutdown Continues, Thousands of Federal Workers Visit D.C. Area PopUp Food Banks, NPR (Jan. 13, 2019, 6:00 AM), https://www.npr.org/2019/01/13/684824384/asshutdown-continues-thousands-of-federal-workers-visit-d-c-area-pop-up-food-ba.
230. Kate Davidson, CBO: Shutdown Will Cost Government $3 Billion of Projected 2019 GDP,
WALL ST. J. (Jan. 28, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/cbo-shutdown-will-cost-government-3billion-of-projected-2019-gdp-11548688574.
231. Peter Baker, Trump Declares National Emergency, and Provokes a Constitutional Clash,
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 15, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/15/us/politics/national-emergencytrump.html.
232. Id.
233. See Sierra Club v. Trump: Border Wall Injunction, U.S. COURTS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT,
https://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/content/view.php?pk_id=0000000995 (last updated Nov. 13, 2019,
11:37 AM) (consolidating the related cases on appeal from the Northern District of California).
Although the United States District Court for the Northern District of California issued a permanent
injunction against construction of the border wall using diverted funds, the Supreme Court granted
a stay of the injunction pending litigation. Trump v. Sierra Club, 140 S. Ct. 1 (2019) (order granting
stay of permanent injunction).
234. Emily Cochrane, Administration to Divert Billions from Pentagon to Fund Border Wall,
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 13, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/13/us/politics/border-wall-fundspentagon.html.
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entry. 235 The immigration laws on this point, however, clearly allow for asylum status irrespective of manner of entry. 236 In less than two weeks, the
United States District Court for the Northern District of California issued a
nationwide temporary restraining order against the policy. 237
Also in fall 2018, President Trump took the dramatic and unprecedented
step of sending some 5000 military troops to the U.S.-Mexico border to meet
the “threat” of a migrant caravan. 238 Human rights researchers documented
that the vast majority of individuals were men, women, children, and families
fleeing violence and humanitarian crises—yet President Trump persisted in
characterizing them as “stone cold criminals” mounting an invasion of the
country. 239 Given the military’s lack of jurisdiction to enforce immigration
laws, the episode largely amounted to an expensive political stunt, as the deployed troops could not permissibly take direct action against migrants. 240
The troops instead provided primarily logistical support to immigration officers at the border. 241 Although some were soon recalled, in February 2019,
President Trump ordered an additional 3750 servicepersons to the border,
bringing the total up to 6000 active military troops. 242
In summer 2018, the Trump Administration under former Attorney
General Jeff Sessions implemented the widely-condemned practice of family
separation. 243 Under Attorney General Sessions’s “zero tolerance” policies,
the DOJ criminally prosecuted asylum-seeker parents who crossed the border
235. Aliens Subject to a Bar on Entry Under Certain Presidential Proclamations; Procedures for
Protection Claims, 83 Fed. Reg. 55,934, 55,934 (Nov. 9, 2018); Proclamation No. 9822, 83 Fed.
Reg. 57,661, 57,661–63 (Nov. 9, 2018).
236. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(1) (2012) (providing that asylum may be granted to “[a]ny alien who
is physically present in the United States or who arrives in the United States” and meets the eligibility requirements).
237. East Bay Sanctuary Covenant v. Trump, 354 F. Supp. 3d 1094 (N.D. Cal. 2018).
238. Alex Ward, The U.S. Is Sending 5,000 Troops to the Border. Here’s What They Can and
Can’t Do, VOX (Oct. 31, 2018), https://www.vox.com/2018/10/29/18026646/military-border-caravan-immigrants-trump-caravan.
239. Bart Jansen & Alan Gomez, President Trump Calls Caravan Immigrants “Stone Cold
Criminals.” Here’s What We Know, USA TODAY (Nov. 26, 2018, 1:39 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/2018/11/26/president-trump-migrant-caravan-criminals/2112846002/; Ward,
supra note 238; see also Kennji Kizuka, Debunking President Trump’s Tweets on the Migrant Caravan, HUM. RTS. FIRST (Oct. 28, 2018), https://www.humanrightsfirst.org/blog/debunking-president-trumps-tweets-migrant-caravan.
240. See 18 U.S.C. § 1385 (“Whoever, except in cases and under circumstances expressly authorized by the Constitution or Act of Congress, willfully uses any part of the Army or the Air Force
as a posse comitatus or otherwise to execute the laws shall be fined under this title or imprisoned
not more than two years, or both.”).
241. Ward, supra note 238.
242. Matthew S. Schwartz, Pentagon Deploying 3,750 Troops to Southern Border, NPR (Feb.
4, 2019, 7:04 AM), https://www.npr.org/2019/02/04/691222383/pentagon-deploying-3-750troops-to-southern-border.
243. Clara Long, The False Choice Between Family Separation and Detention, HUM. RTS.
WATCH (June 26, 2018, 1:07 PM), https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/06/26/false-choice-betweenfamily-separation-and-detention.
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unlawfully with their children; 244 the families were driven to do so in large
part due to U.S. Border Patrol’s refusal to process them at ports of entry. 245
DOJ separated children—including babies and toddlers—from their parents
and sent the parents to federal criminal custody to await trial. The children,
meanwhile, were held in the custody of Office of Refugee Resettlement. The
public broadly condemned the cruelty of the policy, 246 and the United States
Federal District Court for the Southern District of California swiftly enjoined
it. 247 Under the policy, the government separated over five thousand immigrant children from their parents. 248 In some cases, the separations were permanent. 249
In 2019, the administration began requiring thousands of asylum seekers
processed at the southern border to wait in Mexico while their U.S. immigration court cases remained pending. 250 Under the policy, termed the “Migrant
Protection Protocols,” the U.S. government has returned over 60,000 asylum
seekers to Mexico to await their immigration court hearings, despite the significant risks of trafficking, violence, and organized crime that migrants face
244. Fact Sheet on Family Separation for Asylum Seekers, CATHOLIC LEGAL IMMIGR.
NETWORK (2018), https://cliniclegal.org/resources/family-separation/fact-sheet-family-separation
(last updated Aug. 9, 2018). The DOJ charged the parents with either the misdemeanor of “improper
entry by alien,” or under the felony provision for “re-entry by removed alien.” Id.; see 8 U.S.C.
§§ 1325, 1326.
245. See Fact Sheet on Family Separation, supra note 244. The government also separated
some asylum-seeker families presenting at ports of entry, sending the parents to adult ICE detention
and the children to Department of Health and Human Services Office of Refugee Resettlement custody, despite the fact that such presentation does not constitute a crime. Id.
246. See, e.g., Alexandra Yoon-Hendricks & Zoe Greenberg, Protests Across U.S. Call for End
to Migrant Family Separations, N.Y. TIMES (June 30, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/30/us/politics/trump-protests-family-separation.html.
247. See Ms. L. v. U.S Immigration & Customs Enf’t, 310 F. Supp. 3d 1133, 1136 (S.D. Cal.
2018).
248. See Elliot Spagat, Tally of Children Split at Border Tops 5,400 in New Count, ASSOCIATED
PRESS (Oct. 25, 2019), https://apnews.com/c654e652a4674cf19304a4a4ff599feb (reporting Trump
Administration separated over 5400 children from parents since July 2017); see also Family Separation by the Numbers, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/issues/immigrants-rights/immigrants-rightsand-detention/family-separation (last visited Feb. 2, 2020) (reporting over 2600 children separated
in prior count). Due to the failure of DOJ, DHS, and the Office of Refugee Resettlement to keep
records linking the separated children and their parents, the process of reunification of some of the
families dragged on for weeks and even months. See id.
249. See Family Separation by the Numbers, supra note 248. The Trump Administration deported the parents of over a hundred children before they could be reunified, and the families made
the difficult decision for the children to stay in the United States to pursue their cases. Id. As of
October 2018, approximately twenty-six children remained separated due to the government’s opposition to reunification on unfitness or danger grounds. Id.
250. See DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., POLICY GUIDANCE FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
MIGRANT PROTECTION PROTOCOLS (2019), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/19_0129_OPA_migrant-protection-protocols-policy-guidance.pdf; see also 8 U.S.C.
§ 1225(b)(2)(C) (2012); Jason Kao & Denise Lu, How Trump’s Policies Are Leaving Thousands of
Asylum Seekers Waiting in Mexico, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 18, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/08/18/us/mexico-immigration-asylum.html (reporting almost 32,000 individuals subject to return to Mexico under the policy as of August 2019).
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there. 251 Two courts have determined that the policy likely contravenes U.S.
non-refoulement obligations in light of those risks, in addition to violating
domestic immigration laws. 252
Also in 2019, the Trump Administration secured “Asylum Cooperative
Agreements” with Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras. 253 The agreements, in conjunction with a new interim final rule, effectively bar Central
American (and other) asylum seekers arriving by land at the U.S.-Mexico
border from obtaining asylum in the United States, with only limited exceptions. 254 Pursuant to the agreements and regulations, asylum seekers can be
sent back to Guatemala, El Salvador, or Honduras and required to first seek
asylum there, so long as they traveled through that country and are not a citizen there. 255 Such action almost certainly violates international and domes-

251. See generally Molly O’Toole, Asylum Officers Rebel Against Trump Policies They Say Are
Immoral and Illegal, LA TIMES (Nov. 15, 2019, 2:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com/politics/story/2019-11-15/asylum-officers-revolt-against-trump-policies-they-say-are-immoral-illegal
(“Since the Trump administration announced its Migrant Protection Protocols in December, U.S.
officials have pushed roughly 60,000 asylum seekers back across the southern border to wait in
places the State Department considers some of the most dangerous in the world . . . .”); “We Can’t
Help You Here”: US Returns of Asylum Seekers to Mexico, HUM. RTS. WATCH (July 2, 2019),
https://www.hrw.org/report/2019/07/02/we-cant-help-you-here/us-returns-asylum-seekers-mexico
(documenting risks of serious crime, including sexual assault and kidnapping).
252. A federal district court preliminarily enjoined the “Migrant Protection Protocols,” finding
that domestic immigration statutes likely did not permit forced return to Mexico of asylum seekers
and that the policy likely violated the government’s non-refoulement obligations. See Innovation
Law Lab v. Nielsen, 366 F. Supp. 3d 1110, 1123–27 (N.D. Cal. 2019). The Ninth Circuit initially
stayed the injunction, Innovation Law Lab v. McAleenan, 924 F.3d 503, 510 (9th Cir. 2019), but
ultimately agreed with the district court that the policy likely violated the immigration statutes and
U.S. non-refoulement obligations. Innovation Law Lab v. Wolf, No. 19-15716, 2020 WL 964402
(9th Cir. Feb. 28, 2020). Although I served as counsel in this litigation, the views expressed herein
are strictly mine alone.
253. See DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., FACT SHEET: DHS AGREEMENTS WITH GUATEMALA,
HONDURAS, AND EL SALVADOR (2019), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/19_1003_opa_fact-sheet-agreements-northern-central-america-countries.pdf (discussing the
“Agreement between the Government of the United States and the Government of the Republic of
Guatemala on Cooperation in the Examination of Protection Claims” (signed July 26, 2019), the
“Agreement between the Government of the United States and the Government of the Republic of
El Salvador for Cooperation in the Examination of Protection Claims” (signed Sept. 20, 2019), and
the “Agreement between the Government of the United States and the Government of the Republic
of Honduras for Cooperation in the Examination of Protection Claims” (signed Sept. 25, 2019)).
254. See Interim Final Rule: Implementing Bilateral and Multilateral Asylum Cooperative
Agreements Under the Immigration and Nationality Act, 84 Fed. Reg. 63,994, 63,994–96 (Nov. 19,
2019) (explaining that the new regulation “bars an alien subject to [an Alternative Country Agreement] from applying for asylum in the United States,” but that exceptions exist, including when an
officer determines that allowing an individual to apply for asylum in the United States would be in
the “public interest”).
255. See id.
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tic law, which permit such return to “third countries” only where those countries are safe and have functioning asylum systems. 256 Guatemala, Honduras,
and El Salvador all lack such systems, and are among the most dangerous
countries in the world. 257 This policy, too, has been challenged in court. 258
Throughout all these actions, the President has painted a picture of a
border under siege from those seeking refuge. His Twitter account, interviews, and speeches are littered with statements attacking asylum seekers.
For example, he has asserted:
“We shouldn’t be hiring judges by the thousands, as our ridiculous
immigration laws demand, we should be changing our laws, building the Wall, hire Border Agents and Ice and not let people come
into our country based on the legal phrase they are told to say as
their password.” 259
***
“We cannot allow all of these people to invade our Country. When
somebody comes in, we must immediately, with no Judges or
Court Cases, bring them back from where they came. Our system
is a mockery to good immigration policy and Law and Order.” 260
***
“I have instructed the Secretary of Homeland Security not to let
these large Caravans of people into our Country. It is a disgrace.” 261
***
“We have the worst immigration laws in the history of the world,
okay? So it’s a joke. . . . Somebody touches our land, we now take
them to a court, to a judge. They want us to choose 5,000
256. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(A) (2012); Susan Gzesh, “Safe Third Country” Agreements with
Mexico and Guatemala Would be Unlawful, JUST SECURITY (July 15, 2019), https://www.justsecurity.org/64918/safe-third-country-agreements-with-mexico-and-guatemala-would-be-unlawful/.
257. See, e.g., Gzesh, supra note 256 (“Guatemala would not provide protection from persecution for asylum seekers, nor can it provide a ‘full and fair’ procedure for determining asylum
claims.”); Aaron Reichlin-Melnick, What the Safe Third Country Deals Mean for the Future of
Asylum in the United States, IMMIGR. IMPACT (Oct. 4, 2019), https://immigrationimpact.com/2019/10/04/safe-third-country-deals-asylum/ (“Guatemala has just 8 employees in the
agency responsible for hearing asylum applications. El Salvador has just a single employee processing asylum applications . . . . El Salvador has the world’s highest intentional homicide rate.
Honduras is fourth, while Guatemala is 15th.”).
258. See Complaint, U.T. v. Barr, No. 20-00116 (D.D.C. Jan. 15, 2020),
https://www.aclu.org/legal-document/complaint-ut-v-barr.
259. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (June 21, 2018, 5:12 AM), https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/1009770941604298753.
260. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (June 24, 2018, 8:02 AM), https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/1010900865602019329.
261. Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Apr. 23, 2018, 6:44 AM), https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/988413372298416128.
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judges. . . . It’s crazy. . . . If they step on our land, we have judges.
It’s insane. So we’re going to have to change our whole immigration policy.” 262
Attorney General Jeff Sessions also expressed strong views against asylum seekers, broadly questioning the legitimacy of their claims. He cited
“rampant abuse and fraud” and concluded, “[t]he system is being gamed. The
credible fear process . . . has become an easy ticket to illegal entry into the
United States.” 263 In a speech to a national convening of immigration judges,
the same day he issued the Matter of A-B- decision, he pronounced, “the vast
majority of the current asylum claims are not valid.” 264 He asserted, “We can
elevate the threshold standard of proof in credible fear interviews.” 265 And,
as described in Part V below, the Matter of A-B- decision was precisely the
vehicle he used to attempt to do that.
V. MATTER OF A-B-: DECISION, IMPLEMENTATION, INJUNCTION
A. Matter of A-BIn December 2015, an immigration judge in Charlotte, North Carolina,
issued a decision denying asylum to a Salvadoran woman, Ms. A.B., who had
fled over fifteen years of domestic violence in her home country. He did so
despite the binding precedent issued by the BIA in August 2014 in Matter of
A-R-C-G-, which recognized domestic violence as a basis for asylum. 266 The
BIA reversed his denial and took the unusual step of directing a grant of asylum below so long as background checks cleared. 267 Nevertheless, Ms.
A.B.’s case remained unresolved due to the actions of the immigration judge
on remand. Instead of granting asylum as directed after security checks returned, the immigration judge attempted to “certify” the case back to the BIA

262. Remarks at a Lunch with Republican Members of Congress and an Exchange with Reporters, 2018 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1, 11 (June 26, 2018).
263. Attorney General Jeff Sessions Delivers Remarks to Executive Office for Immigration Review, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Oct. 12, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-generaljeff-sessions-delivers-remarks-executive-office-immigration-review.
264. Attorney General Sessions Delivers Remarks to the Executive Office for Immigration Review Legal Training Program, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (June 11, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-general-sessions-delivers-remarks-executive-office-immigration-review-legal.
265. Attorney General Jeff Sessions Delivers Remarks to Executive Office for Immigration Review, supra note 263.
266. A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 388, 390, 395 (B.I.A. 2014).
267. Specifically, the BIA ordered that the case be remanded to the Immigration Judge “for the
purpose of allowing [DHS] the opportunity to complete or update identity, law enforcement, or
security investigations or examinations, and further proceedings, if necessary, and for the entry of
an order as provided by 8 C.F.R. § 1003.47(h).” A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 247, 248 (A.G. 2018)
(alteration in original) (quoting A-B-, at 4 (B.I.A. Dec. 8, 2016)).
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without issuing a new decision—an unauthorized procedural mechanism that
fell outside the scope of applicable regulations. 268
In March 2018, Attorney General Sessions personally intervened in the
case, invoking 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(h)(1)(i). 269 The DHS countenanced caution, moving for the Attorney General to suspend briefing in the case due to
its defective procedural posture. 270 In the alternative, DHS asked the Attorney General to both clarify the scope of his intervention and to extend the
parties’ briefing schedule. DHS explained that it needed more time “due to
the complexity of the issues involved in this matter and the need for extensive
intra-Departmental coordination.” 271 Attorney General Sessions denied the
motion to suspend briefing despite recognizing “[t]he Immigration Judge did
not act within his authority.” 272 Attorney General Sessions also declined to
issue any clarification, and permitted only a partial extension of time for
briefing, not the full amount requested by the DHS. 273
On the merits, both Ms. A.B. and DHS submitted briefing in the case
urging the Attorney General to uphold Matter of A-R-C-G-. The Department
opened its brief asserting, “The Department generally supports the legal
framework set out by the Board in Matter of A-R-C-G- . . . for the adjudication of asylum and statutory withholding of removal applications premised
on inter-partner domestic violence and the protected ground of membership
in a particular social group.” 274
On June 11, 2018, the Attorney General issued a decision rejecting this
view. He overruled the prior BIA precedent in Matter of A-R-C-G- and also
reversed the favorable decision of the BIA in Ms. A.B.’s own case. Attorney
268. Id. at 248–49 (describing procedural history); see infra note 272 and accompanying text
(explaining Attorney General Sessions’ conclusion that the procedural mechanism used by the immigration judge was defective).
269. A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 227 (A.G. 2018) (certification order); A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316,
317 (A.G. 2018) (merits decision); see supra notes 170–172 and accompanying text (describing
certification authority of the Attorney General).
270. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. Motion on Certification to the Attorney General, A-B-, 27 I.
& N. 316 (A.G. 2018) (merits decision) (on file with author). DHS contended that invocation of 8
C.F.R. § 1003.1(h) was not appropriate because jurisdiction for the case had never vested back to
the BIA, as the immigration judge’s attempt to “certify” the case back to the BIA was procedurally
defective. See id. at 2; see also 8 C.F.R. §1003.1(h)(1)(i) (2019) (providing mechanism for the BIA
to “refer to the Attorney General for review of its decision all cases that . . . [t]he Attorney General
directs the Board to refer to him,” without referencing analogous mechanism for an immigration
judge). Attorney General Sessions agreed that the immigration judge’s actions were defective but,
nevertheless, ruled that he himself had authority to certify a case still technically with the immigration judge. See A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316, 321–22, n.2 (A.G. 2018) (merits decision) (noting “procedurally defective” action by Immigration Judge Couch); A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 247, 248–49 (A.G.
2018) (noting the same defective action).
271. Motion on Certification to the Attorney General, supra note 270, at 4.
272. A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 247, 248 (A.G. 2018).
273. See id. at 249–50.
274. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. Brief on Referral to the Attorney General at 2, A-B-, 27 I. &
N. Dec. 316 (A.G. 2018) (on file with author).
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General Sessions’s decision relied heavily upon the BIA’s purported failure
to engage in in-depth analysis in A-R-C-G-. He criticized, in particular, the
BIA’s reliance on concessions by DHS with regard to particular social groups
and other legal issues in the case. 275 Attorney General Sessions invoked his
authority under the Chevron framework, concluding “the phrase ‘membership in a particular social group’ is ambiguous” 276 and emphasizing his own
“primary responsibility for construing ambiguous provisions in the immigration laws.” 277 His discussion of this authority cited the Supreme Court’s decisions in National Cable & Telecommunications Ass’n v. Brand X Internet
Services, Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,
Negusie v. Holder, and Immigration & Naturalization Services. v. AguirreAguirre. 278
Yet, his decision went far beyond merely construing the term “particular
social group,” to generally opine on facts and circumstances not present in
Ms. A.B.’s case. Among the more reaching aspects of his decision was its
conclusion that “[g]enerally, claims by aliens pertaining to domestic violence
or gang violence perpetrated by non-governmental actors will not qualify for
asylum” 279—notwithstanding the fact the Ms. A.B. herself did not present a
gang claim. Attorney General Sessions additionally concluded in a footnote
that “[a]ccordingly, few such claims would satisfy the legal standard to determine whether an alien has a credible fear of persecution.” 280
The decision also muddled the long-established standard for failure of
state protection against harm by non-state actors, which requires only that a
home government be unable or unwilling to protect the individual. As the
BIA has previously noted, the “unable or unwilling” standard governed
claims for refugee protection under U.S. law even prior to the passage of the
Refugee Act. 281 Under this standard, a refugee need show only either that
her country of origin cannot effectively protect her, or that it is unwilling for
275. A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316, 334–35 (A.G. 2018) (merits decision).
276. Id. at 326.
277. Id.
278. Id. at 326–27 (“The Attorney General’s reasonable construction of an ambiguous term in
the Act, such as ‘membership in a particular social group,’ is entitled to deference.” (citing Nat’l
Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 980 (2005); Chevron, U.S.A.
Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984); Negusie v. Holder, 555 U.S. 511,
516 (2009); Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 425 (1999))).
279. Id. at 320.
280. Id. at 320 n.1 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(v) (2012)).
281. See Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 222–23 (B.I.A. 1985) (“We conclude that the pre-Refugee
Act construction of ‘persecution’ should be applied to the term as it appears in section 101(a)(42)(A)
of the Act. It is a basic rule of statutory construction that words used in an original act or section,
that are repeated in subsequent legislation with a similar purpose, are presumed to be used in the
same sense in the subsequent legislation.” (quoting Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 581 (1978)));
id. at 222 (determining that one of the “significant aspects” of the “accepted construction of the term
‘persecution’” was “harm or suffering had to be inflicted either by the government of a country or
by persons or an organization that the government was unable or unwilling to control”).
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any reason to do so. 282 Yet Attorney General Sessions articulated the standard as requiring the home government to “condone[]” or be “complete[ly]
helpless[]” to protect an applicant against harm. 283
In perhaps the most disturbing part of his decision, Attorney General
Sessions addressed nexus—the statutorily-required link between harm and
one of the five protected grounds—in a manner that implicitly questioned the
very viability of gender-based persecution claims, which, as explained above,
often arise in the context of community, family, and partner relationships. 284
Unlike the term “particular social group,” the statute provides a clear definition for nexus, requiring that protected ground on which an individual is seeking asylum be “one central reason” for persecution—a standard that permits
mixed motives for harm. 285 Attorney General Sessions, however, characterized domestic violence as personal harm beyond the reach of refugee protection. He opined that “[w]hen private actors inflict violence based on a personal relationship with a victim, then the victim’s membership in a larger
group may well not be ‘one central reason’ for the abuse.”286 He suggested
that domestic violence survivors, as “victim[s] of private criminal activity,”
may have difficulty in showing “that their persecutors harmed them on account of their membership in that group rather than for personal reasons.” 287
More simply, he stated, “An alien may suffer threats and violence in a foreign
country for any number of reasons relating to her social, economic, family,
or other personal circumstances. Yet the asylum statute does not provide
redress for all misfortune.” 288
282. See Rosa v. Immigration & Naturalization Servs., 440 F.2d 100, 102 (1st Cir. 1971) (recognizing viability of refugee claim if non-governmental persecutor is able “to carry out its purposes
without effective hindrance”); Eusaph, 10 I. & N. Dec. 453, 454 (B.I.A. 1964) (indicating that nongovernmental persecution would qualify if “the police powers of the government have degenerated
to the point where it is unable to take proper measures to control individual cases of violence”). A
post-Matter of A-B- decision by the First Circuit confirms the continuing understanding of this
standard. See Rosales Justo v. Sessions, 895 F.3d 154, 163 (1st Cir. 2018) (holding that “an applicant must prove either unwillingness or inability” (emphasis added)).
283. A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316, 337 (A.G. 2018) (merits decision).
284. See supra Part III.
285. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (2012) (persecution must be “on account of” protected
ground); id. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i) (specifying that protected ground must be “one central reason” for
the harm); see also N-M-, 25 I. & N. Dec. 526, 530 (B.I.A. 2011) (explaining that nexus can be
established “where an [individual] demonstrates more than one plausible motive for the harm imposed or the harm feared”).
286. A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316, 338–39 (A.G. 2018) (merits decision).
287. Id. at 317.
288. Id. at 318. Feminist scholars and theorists, of course, have long rejected the divide between
“personal” and “public” harm. Overcoming these distinctions in the law has been a core aim of the
gender equality movement through the years. See, e.g., Ronnie Cohen & Shannon O’Byrne, “Can
You Hear Me Now . . . Good!”® Feminism(s), the Public/Private Divide, and Citizens United v.
FEC, 20 UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 39, 39 (2013) (“An important goal identified by early feminists was
to challenge and even eliminate the distinction between the public and private spheres.”). Although
an in-depth exploration of that literature is outside the scope of this Article, the elimination of the
public/private divide has been key to the advancement of women’s equality in, for example, the
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Attorney General Sessions’ decision was a clear attempt to largely shut
the door on women seeking asylum on the basis of domestic violence. His
decision also reflects an explicit desire to impact credible fear screenings at
the border for these women and many other asylum seekers.
B. Immediate Implementation
Despite having taken a position urging the Attorney General to uphold
Matter of A-R-C-G- in Ms. A.B.’s case, DHS moved quickly to implement
his decision in Matter of A-B-, including in credible fear proceedings. On
June 13, 2018, John Lafferty, the head of the Asylum Office, issued interim
guidance instructing officers to apply the decision. 289 The brief interim guidance instructed officers in merits adjudications and screening interviews that
they should no longer cite to or rely on Matter of A-R-C-G-, and instead conduct a case-by-case analysis of particular social groups under pre-existing
BIA caselaw.
On July 11, 2018, however, far more reaching final guidance replaced
the interim guidance. 290 That guidance, notably, was issued on USCIS letterhead with no authorship attribution—diverging from USCIS’s prior practice of issuing guidance attributed to and signed by the head of the asylum
office. 291 The final guidance instructed (in boldface font) that “[i]n general . . . claims based on membership in a putative particular social group defined by the members’ vulnerability to harm of domestic violence or gang

movement for equal pay, the criminalization of domestic violence, the extension of rape laws to
marital relationships, and the recognition of a Title VII claim against sexual harassment. See, e.g.,
id.; Celina Romany, Women as Aliens: A Feminist Critique of the Public/Private Distinction in
International Human Rights Law, 6 H ARV . H UM . R TS . J. 87, 123 (1993); Vicki Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, 107 YALE L.J. 1683, 1702 (1998). Notably, decades of research
have confirmed the gendered dynamics of domestic violence—research presented to, but never once
cited by, Attorney General Sessions. See Brief of Respondent at 39–40, A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316
(A.G.
2018),
https://uchastings.app.box.com/s/tt1ydliq5ttm1i2zxlz4rname4bk29s7/file/291241595459.
289. E-mail from John L. Lafferty to RAIO – Asylum Field Office Managers; RAIO – Asylum
Field Office Staff; and RAIO – Asylum HQ (June 13, 2018, 5:20 PM) (on file with author) (including USCIS Asylum Division Interim Guidance following the Matter of A-B- merits decision).
290. U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., PM-602-0162, GUIDANCE FOR PROCESSING
REASONABLE FEAR, CREDIBLE FEAR, ASYLUM, AND REFUGEE CLAIMS IN ACCORDANCE WITH
MATTER OF A-B-, (2018) [hereinafter USCIS GUIDANCE].
291. See, e.g., JOHN LAFFERTY, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., HQRAIO
120/9.15a, GUIDANCE ON IMMEDIATE FAMILY MEMBERS IN CREDIBLE FEAR (2014),
https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/Outreach/Notes%20from%20Previous%20Engagements/2014/MEMO_Guidanc
e_on_Immediate_Family_Members_in_Credible_Fear.pdf; JOHN LAFFERTY, U.S. CITIZENSHIP &
IMMIGRATION SERVS., HQRAIO 120/9.15b, RELEASE OF ASYLUM DIVISION OFFICER TRAINING
COURSE (ADOTC) LESSON PLAN, CREDIBLE FEAR OF PERSECUTION OR TORTURE DETERMINATIONS
(2014), https://www.fairus.org/sites/default/files/2017-08/dhs_asylum_doc_4212014.pdf.
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violence committed by non-government actors will not establish the basis
for . . . a credible or reasonable fear of persecution.” 292
The USCIS Guidance (“Guidance”) also directed officers to apply the
restrictive analysis of A-B- in several respects—going far beyond simply requiring adherence to A-B-’s central holding in reversing A-R-C-G-. For example, the Guidance stated that “when a private actor inflicts violence based
on a personal relationship with the victim, the victim’s membership in a
larger group often will not be ‘one central reason’ for the abuse.” 293 It imported A-B-’s conclusory statements regarding social groups to conclude that
any social group involving inability to leave a relationship is circular. 294 The
Guidance also incorporated A-B-’s language that the government must condone or be completely helpless to stop persecution by a private actor. 295
The Guidance additionally sought to maximize the reach of A-B- vis-àvis federal circuit court decisions, directing that asylum officers must “apply
the case law of the relevant federal circuit court, to the extent that those cases
are not inconsistent with Matter of A-B-.” 296 It defined the relevant circuit as
the one where the applicant is physically present, explaining that circuit law
elsewhere can simply be ignored—even in the context of screening, and not
merits adjudications—simply because DHS might relocate individuals elsewhere in the country if they establish credible fear. This attempt to avoid
consideration of favorable circuit court decisions marked a departure from
prior agency practice. Previously, USCIS Guidance directed officers to apply the circuit interpretations most favorable to the applicant when conducting border screening interviews. 297
The Guidance instructions were particularly jarring given the asylum
office’s longstanding recognition of gender-based persecution claims, including in the context of domestic violence.298 As described in Part III,
agency guidance, dating back to the legacy INS era, long recognized the validity of women’s asylum claims, and more recent asylum office training materials have confirmed this understanding. 299
292. USCIS GUIDANCE, supra note 290, at 6.
293. Id.
294. Id. at 5 (“The applicant must show something more than the danger of harm from an abuser
if the applicant tried to leave, because that would amount to circularly defining the particular social
group by the harm on which the asylum claim was based.”).
295. Id. at 6.
296. Id. at 8–9 (emphasis added).
297. U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERV’S, ASYLUM DIVISION OFFICER TRAINING
COURSE: CREDIBLE FEAR OF PERSECUTION AND TORTURE DETERMINATIONS 17, 47 (2017),
https://www.aila.org/File/DownloadEmbeddedFile/70907; U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION
SERV’S, ASYLUM DIVISION OFFICER TRAINING COURSE: REASONABLE FEAR OF PERSECUTION
AND TORTURE DETERMINATIONS 11 (2017), https://www.aila.org/File/DownloadEmbeddedFile/70908.
298. See supra Section III.B.
299. See Coven, supra note 215; U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., supra note 216.
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C. Grace v. Sessions—Matter of A-B- Enjoined at the Border
In August 2018, plaintiffs represented by the American Civil Liberties
Union and the Center for Gender & Refugee Studies challenged the application of Matter of A-B- and the related USCIS Policy Guidance in expedited
removal. The twelve plaintiffs—nine adult asylum seekers and three minor
children—contended that numerous aspects of the decision and guidance violated the laws governing asylum and expedited removal. They also alleged
constitutional due process and separation of powers violations. 300 Although
the lawsuit was not a class action, it sought systemic relief under a provision
of the immigration laws, Title 8, section 1252(e)(3) of the United States
Code, which authorizes challenges to expedited removal policies in the
United States. 301
On December 18, 2019, the United States District Court for the District
of Columbia entered a permanent injunction prohibiting DHS and immigration judges from applying several aspects of Matter of A-B- and the USCIS
guidance. 302 The district court decision addressed plaintiffs’ statutory claims,
raised under the Administrative Procedure Act and applied Chevron in reviewing Matter of A-B-.

300. Complaint, Grace v. Sessions, No. 18-cv-1853, 2018 WL 3812445 (D.D.C. Aug. 7, 2018).
The plaintiffs’ statutory claims alleged violations of the Refugee Act, Immigration and Nationality
Act, and Administrative Procedure Act. Id.
301. The applicable provision reads:
(A) In general
Judicial review of determinations under section 1225(b) of this title and its implementation is available in an action instituted in the United States District Court for the District
of Columbia, but shall be limited to determinations of—
(i) whether such section, or any regulation issued to implement such section, is constitutional; or
(ii) whether such a regulation, or a written policy directive, written policy guideline,
or written procedure issued by or under the authority of the Attorney General to implement such section, is not consistent with applicable provisions of this subchapter or is
otherwise in violation of law.
(B) Deadlines for bringing actions
Any action instituted under this paragraph must be filed no later than 60 days after the
date the challenged section, regulation, directive, guideline, or procedure described in
clause (i) or (ii) of subparagraph (A) is first implemented.
8 U.S.C § 1252(e)(3)(A)–(B) (2012). The provision guarantees judicial review of expedited removal policies notwithstanding jurisdiction-stripping provisions of the same section, which limit
review of individual expedited removal decisions and orders. See id. § 1252(e)(1)–(2). Of note,
however, the sixty-day limitation and the requirement that the suit be brought in the D.C. federal
district court pose large barriers to non-sophisticated litigators.
302. Grace v. Whitaker, 344 F. Supp. 3d 96, 124 (D.D.C. 2018)
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The court found that Chevron deference does apply to decisions of the
Attorney General interpreting the “particular social group” ground for asylum. 303 Judge Sullivan then analyzed the general rule that domestic violence
and gang claims will fail under Chevron step two, rejecting it as unreasonable
for several reasons. He found “no legal basis” for the rule in the statute and
deemed it inconsistent with Congress’s intent to comply with its international
refugee law obligations and to ensure non-discriminatory treatment of
claims. 304 Additionally, he concluded the rule violated the individualized adjudication system for asylum, including at the credible fear stage, as well as
the governing standard for credible fear:
The Attorney General’s direction to deny most domestic violence
or gang violence claims at the credible fear determination stage is
fundamentally inconsistent with the threshold screening standard
that Congress established: an alien’s removal may not be expedited
if there is a “significant possibility” that the alien could establish
eligibility for asylum. 305
The district court also rejected—this time at Chevron step one—the
heightened state protection standard requiring an applicant to show that her
government “condoned” or was “completely helpless” to protect her against
non-State actor persecution. 306 The court ruled that the settled meaning of
“persecution” enacted by Congress in the 1980 Refugee Act required only a
showing of the government’s inability or unwillingness to provide effective
protection. 307
Judge Sullivan additionally held that the USCIS Guidance’s prohibition
of social groups involving an “inability to leave” a relationship was arbitrary
and capricious. 308 According to Judge Sullivan, the Guidance’s conclusion
on this point both went beyond A-B- itself and misconstrued existing agency
caselaw on circularity, as prior agency precedent had never required social
groups to be completely independent from harm. 309 Thus, he reaffirmed that
social group cognizability is a fact-specific analysis. 310

303. Id. (“[T]he Court concludes that Congress has not ‘spoken directly’ on the precise question
of whether victims of domestic or gang-related persecution fall into the particular social group category.”). The court notably rejected the government’s contention that Matter of A-B- and the guidance’s statement that domestic violence and gang claims “will generally fail” did not set forth a
general rule. Id. at 125 (“The government’s principal response is straightforward: no such general
rule against domestic violence or gang-related claims exists.”).
304. Id. at 126.
305. Id. at 126–27.
306. Id. at 128.
307. Id.
308. Id. at 133.
309. See id.; USCIS GUIDANCE, supra note 290, at 5.
310. Grace, 344 F. Supp. 3d at 133.
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Finally, Judge Sullivan enjoined the USCIS Guidance’s requirement
that asylum officers ignore circuit law contrary to Matter of A-B- in adjudicating credible fear cases.311 He observed first, that the wide-ranging analyses in A-B- that stretched beyond the legal effect of overruling Matter of AR-C-G- were mere dicta, as conceded by the government—and therefore not
entitled to deference under Brand X. 312 Judge Sullivan continued, “[s]imply
put, Brand X is not a license for agencies to rely on dicta to ignore otherwise
binding circuit precedent.” 313 He additionally enjoined the instruction to officers only to apply circuit law in which the applicant was physically present,
reasoning that this instruction violated the “significant possibility” standard
for credible fear by forcing adjudicators to ignore favorable circuit law that
would allow applicants to meet the standard. 314
To remedy these illegalities, Judge Sullivan enjoined the government
from applying the unlawful aspects of Matter of A-B- and the USCIS Guidance. He further vacated the expedited removal orders of the twelve individual plaintiffs and ordered the government to bring back to the United States
any of the plaintiffs it had removed. 315
***
The Grace injunction, which remains in effect pending appeal, 316 has
served as a critical check against executive overreach at the border. The district court rightly concluded that the Matter of A-B- decision conflicted with
the statutory refugee definition and the laws governing expedited removal, as
well as unreasonably interpreted ambiguities in the statute. The relief the
court ordered, however, was limited in two respects. First, the injunction
failed to reach asylum seekers who were previously deported pursuant to the
unlawful interpretations adopted by USCIS in implementing Matter of A-B-;
as a result, many individuals who are in fact refugees were likely refouled
without clear remedy. Second, the court injunction left in place a structurally
unsound system of credible fear adjudications, in which future unlawful decisions of the agency may continue to be applied and also result in refoulement of refugees. Below, I consider how different approaches to agency

311. The USCIS Guidance instructs that, when conducting credible fear interviews: “The asylum officer should . . . apply the case law of the relevant federal circuit court, to the extent that those
cases are not inconsistent with Matter of A-B-.” See USCIS GUIDANCE, supra note 290, at 8.
312. Grace, 344 F. Supp. 3d at 138 n.22 (“According to the government, the only legal effect
of Matter of A-B- is to overrule Matter of A-R-C-G-. Any other self-described dicta would not be
entitled to deference under Chevron and therefore Brand X could not apply.”).
313. Id.
314. Id. at 139–40. The court also enjoined a portion of the USCIS Policy Guidance that required applicants to themselves articulate a particular social group at the credible fear stage. Id. at
135.
315. Id. at 144–45.
316. Notice of Appeal at 2, Grace v. Whitaker, 344 F. Supp. 3d 96 (D.D.C. 2018) (No. 1:18-cv01853-EGS).
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decisionmaking and judicial review at the border can better avoid refoulement.
VI. REGULATING THE BORDER
For now, a discussion of permissible agency interpretations of law at the
border begins with an inquiry under Chevron. Yet many scholars have carefully probed and questioned the applicability and contours of Chevron in immigration space. Professor Kevin Johnson has persuasively argued that the
political accountability underpinnings of Chevron disfavor its use in this
space. He observes that Chevron’s “political process rationale does not apply
comfortably to the immigration bureaucracy for a simple reason—noncitizens cannot formally participate in the political process.” 317 Because immigrants lack the power of the vote, they have little ability to hold the executive
branch officials accountable through the elected office of the Presidency. 318
Moreover, it is precisely the rights of these disenfranchised individuals at
stake in the decisions of the agency.
Whereas Professor Johnson has suggested eliminating Chevron deference to the decisions of the immigration agency entirely, 319 others have proposed modifying the framework or discarding Chevron for certain subsets of
agency decisions. Professor Bassina Farbenblum, for example, urges
stronger incorporation of an international law perspective at Chevron step
one for asylum and withholding decisions. Because Congress has indicated
an intent to conform with international law obligations, she argues that courts
should look to international law consensus and interpretations to construe the
plain meaning of the statute. 320 Or, at a minimum, Professor Farbenblum
proposes that consistency with international refugee law must robustly inform Chevron step two, prompting U.S. federal courts to more closely scrutinize decisions out-of-step with comparative and international law. 321 Examining Congressional intent, the structure of the Department of Justice, and
the evolution of Chevron doctrine—and in particular its step zero—Professor
Maureen Sweeney concludes that Chevron should not apply to asylum and
withholding decisions of the Attorney General or BIA. 322 She highlights the
317. Kevin R. Johnson, Hurricane Katrina: Lessons About Immigrants in the Administrative
State, 45 HOUS. L. REV. 11, 37 (2008).
318. See id. at 39.
319. Id. at 43 (“One incremental solution would be to eliminate Chevron-style deference to the
decisions of the immigration bureaucracy. Meaningful judicial review would encourage the immigration agencies to take greater care in immigration matters and to comply with the law.”).
320. Bassina Farbenblum, Executive Deference in U.S. Refugee Law: Internationalist Paths
Through and Beyond Chevron, 60 DUKE L.J. 1059, 1096, 1098 (2011).
321. Id. at 1104.
322. Maureen A. Sweeney, Enforcing/Protection: The Danger of Chevron in Refugee Act Cases
71 ADMIN. L. REV. 127 (2019). Professor Alina Das makes a similar argument with regard to the
interpretation of federal immigration detention statutes, arguing that Chevron should not apply in
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dangers of allowing the head or functionaries of the Department of Justice—
which has core prosecutorial functions against immigrants, for example, the
crimes of illegal entry and re-entry—to also interpret asylum laws designed
to protect vulnerable populations. 323 Professor Mary Holper has scrutinized
the Attorney General certification process in particular, suggesting that the
Attorney General’s precedent decisions in the criminal immigration context
should not survive Chevron step zero. She contends that they fail to adequately allow public input, ensure transparency, or reflect careful consideration, and as a result, should be analyzed outside Chevron altogether. 324
The invocation of certification authority in Matter of A-B- reflects each
of the concerns explored by the scholars above. Asylum seekers, such as Ms.
A.B. and the thousands of others in removal and credible fear proceedings to
whom the decision has been applied, lack a voice in the political process.
The certification of Ms. A.B.’s case also failed to reflect a fair, transparent,
and accountable process. 325 And, the Attorney General’s core prosecutorial
functions, including those deployed against asylum seekers who enter unlawfully, raise serious doubts about the office’s ability to engage in impartial and
protection-oriented adjudication of asylum claims. Indeed, former Attorney
General Sessions used the power of his office to target asylum-seeker families via the criminal process, including by using unlawful entry prosecutions
to effectuate the Administration’s widely-condemned family separation policies. 326 In prior statements, he also expressed skepticism over the validity
of the asylum system as a whole as well as subsets of claims within them. 327
Yet, although I agree with the normative non-applicability of Chevron
deference to Matter of A-B- in merits adjudications for all of these reasons, I
consider here the special concerns posed by applying this decision—and others that adopt restrictive interpretations of asylum law—specifically at the
border. Correctly or not, the Supreme Court has applied Chevron to substantive interpretations of the refugee definition arising in merits adjudications of
asylum claims. Even so, it does not follow that agency screening interpretations should proceed in the same way. Thus, I consider how courts should
apply Chevron for border screening interviews, and how agencies should

habeas review of detention. Alina Das, Unshackling Habeas Review: Chevron Deference and Statutory Interpretation in Immigration Detention Cases, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 143, 189 (2015).
323. See also Stephen H. Legomsky, Learning to Live with Unequal Justice: Asylum and the
Limits to Consistency, 60 STAN. L. REV. 413, 464 (2007) (“An argument can be made, however,
that deference has less justification in asylum cases than in other areas.”). Specifically, Professor
Legomsky observes that ideological biases of immigration judges resulting in huge disparities in
asylum grant rates diminish rationales for deference. Id.
324. Mary Holper, Failing Chevron Step Zero, 76 BROOK. L. REV. 1241, 1243 (2011).
325. See supra Section V.A.
326. See supra notes 243–249 and accompanying text.
327. See supra notes 263–265 and accompanying text.
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structure and apply DOJ precedent decisions. I also offer thoughts on how
these recommendations might continue to hold in a post-Chevron world.
A. Precedent and Deference Frameworks at the Border
As discussed, Chevron and its progeny rely on two core justifications
for the framework. Deference is due to policy functions of the executive
branch, ensuring democratic accountability for policy choices.328 Deference
is also due to agency expertise, including technical know-how arising from
the qualifications of agency officials and their day-to-day experience of administering the statute.329
In chaotic border interviews, however, an incongruous picture emerges.
Asylum office adjudicators are indeed specialized in their field, trained not
only on substantive asylum law, but also on interviewing techniques, the special needs of trauma survivors in an adjudicative setting, and the country conditions of sending nations, among other topics. 330 Yet their decisions are
given no real weight under the adjudicative framework. Rather, the asylum
officers are bound by the opinions of the BIA—who are immigration generalists, not asylum specialists—and the Attorney General, who is even further
removed and charged with enforcing all of U.S. law.
With regard to policy considerations, the office of the Attorney General
(and to a lesser extent the Board of Immigration Appeals directly under the
Attorney General) is closer to democratic accountability than the asylum officer at the border. Justice Kagan, writing prior to her time on the bench, has
argued that the accountability principle is so central to Chevron that full deference should extend only to the agency head receiving delegated authority
from Congress. 331 Thus, she urged adoption of what she and Judge David
Barron termed an “internal-agency nondelegation doctrine.” 332 They posit
that the closer an official sits in the chain of command to the agency head,
the greater the leeway the courts should provide under Chevron. Compared
to a low-level official, the agency head is far more accountable to the will of
the people due to the nature and visibility of her office. Justice Scalia reflects
echoes of this thinking as well. Although he would not limit broad Chevron
step two deference to high-ranking officials, he locates justifications of Chevron in the policy functions of the agency. 333 However, Justice Gorsuch, in
328. See supra notes 17–21 and accompanying text.
329. See supra notes 22–24 and accompanying text.
330. See Paskey, supra note 159; Boas, supra note 159.
331. David J. Barron & Elena Kagan, Chevron’s Nondelegation Doctrine, 2001 SUP. CT. REV.
201, 242–43 (2001).
332. Id. (“It is only the presence of high-level agency officials that makes plausible Chevron’s
claimed connection between agencies and the public; and it is only the involvement of these officials
in decision making that makes possible the kind of political accountability that Chevron viewed as
compelling deference.”).
333. See Scalia, supra note 25.
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his views against existing deference frameworks, tacks decidedly away from
political and policy reasons for deference to agencies and toward their expertise instead. 334
The asylum screening system presents something of a conundrum under
the differing aims and rationales of Chevron. Its day-to-day work is carried
out primarily by specialized asylum officials in one agency (DHS) who sit
several degrees removed from political accountability. On the other hand,
asylum precedents are generated by the agency head or their delegate in another (DOJ), with the Attorney General of course being a cabinet-level official confirmed by the Senate. What role should each of these two disparate
functionaries play with regard to asylum adjudications in credible fear proceedings? What agency law should govern at the border, and when should it
apply? And how might deference apply in the absence of Chevron?
In thinking through these questions, we should also consider that credible fear interviews are different from merits adjudications. As explained in
Part II, credible fear processes are curtailed and rife with documented problems. Applicants do not receive full procedural protections of immigration
removal proceedings; nor do they have the time to secure counsel or prepare
claims as they would in a merits adjudication. 335 In this context, mistakes are
likely. Thus, whatever framework applies must give adjudicators leeway for
error. But error, of course, can run in both directions. A screening official
may err in thinking that an applicant has a viable claim when she does not.
Or the official may decide the applicant has little chance of prevailing when
in fact the individual’s claim—fleshed out in better processes and with the
benefit of counsel and preparation—is strong. So, for which type of error
should the applicable framework create room?
I posit that these sets of questions—on adjudicative roles, governing
precedent, and allowances for error in credible fear proceedings—can be resolved by looking at the overarching statute and its aims. Although decisions
of the Attorney General and BIA do bind both immigration judges and asylum officers in adjudicating merits claims under the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), 336 three key aspects of statutory design favor a different
approach to implementation of DOJ precedent in credible fear screenings.
First, and most critically, Congress specified a low screening threshold
for credible fear. The statute requires an applicant at this stage to show only
a “significant possibility” that they will prove their asylum claim at a full
hearing. 337 Moreover, as discussed above, Congress was explicit in selecting

334. See supra Section I.D.
335. See supra Section II.D.
336. See 8 U.S.C. § 1103 (2012).
337. Id. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(v) (“For purposes of this subparagraph, the term ‘credible fear of persecution’ means that there is a significant possibility, taking into account the credibility of the statements made by the alien in support of the alien’s claim and such other facts as are known to the
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this standard to prevent the possibility of refoulement of refugees at the border. 338 The point, in short, was to err on the side of screening in, and not out.
This favors a generous and protective read of substantive asylum law in credible fear screenings.
Second, Congress’s 1996 reforms codified into the INA the existence
and importance of the asylum office. 339 Although originally a creature of
regulation, the asylum office was formalized by Congress specifically in the
context of credible fear. As explained above, the laws now mandate that
credible fear interviews be conducted by asylum officers, overseen by supervisory officers who have asylum adjudication experience. 340 They also require that both adjudicating officers and their supervisors receive training in
substantive law, interviewing techniques, and country conditions. 341 The
command here is clear: The credible fear process falls within the jurisdiction
of a specialized and protection-oriented asylum office—not officials within
the enforcement arms of the government. For this reason, CBP-officer
screening decisions would not only run afoul of the statute, 342 but should also
fail to garner any deference in statutory interpretations.
Finally, the refugee definition that applies in credible fear derives from
the Refugee Act of 1980, in which Congress enacted a non-discriminatory
asylum system to course-correct from a prior politicized era. As previously
recounted, the executive branch had once allowed foreign policy interests,
geography, and political ideology to guide U.S. refugee decisions. 343 In enacting a universal refugee definition conforming to the international law definition, Congress expressed a clear and unequivocal intent to de-politicize the
asylum adjudication system. 344
Taken together, these congressional actions favor a modified approach
to agency adjudications at the border. In immediately implementing Matter
of A-B- to such an extreme extent, DHS officials likely refouled refugees in
violation of both the credible fear standard and U.S. international law obligations. If we take seriously Congress’s clearly-stated desire to adhere to those
officer, that the alien could establish eligibility for asylum . . . .”); see also Grace v. Whitaker, 344
F. Supp. 3d 96, 107 (D.D.C 2018) (characterizing credible fear as a low screening standard).
338. See supra Section II.B.
339. See supra Section II.C.
340. See 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(E) (providing the definition of “asylum officer”); see also supra
Section II.C.
341. See 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(E).
342. See supra notes 175–177 and accompanying text.
343. See supra Section II.A.
344. The Court’s Chevron doctrine also generally favors construing the statute as a cohesive
whole. See Food & Drug Admin. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 133 (2000)
(“A court must therefore interpret the statute ‘as a symmetrical and coherent regulatory scheme,’
and ‘fit, if possible, all parts into a harmonious whole.’” (first quoting Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513
U.S. 561, 569 (1995), then quoting FTC v. Mandel Bros., Inc., 359 U.S. 385, 389 (1959))) (discussing statutory interpretation at Chevron step one).
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obligations, we must consider a different approach to the review and implementation of agency precedent at the border.
B. Solutions for a Well-Regulated Border
To ensure better asylum decisionmaking at the border, I propose several
changes below for the agency and the courts. For each, I draw upon my earlier discussions to explore theoretical and practical justifications for these
shifts. I also briefly consider how Congress might step in to ensure better
fidelity to its laws.
1. Agency
Below, I provide three recommendations for the agencies involved in
credible fear adjudications at the border. Each is rooted in the statutory design of our asylum system, as well as in administrative law principles. First,
I recommend that DHS delay implementation of protection-restricting DOJ
precedent decisions in credible fear processes. Second, I propose that DHS
simply not apply restrictive DOJ precedent decided under Chevron step two,
wherein the agency construes statutory ambiguities. Finally, I suggest elevation of the role of the asylum office in adjudications leading to precedent DOJ
decisions.
a. A Wait-and-See Approach for Agency Adjudication at the
Border: Delayed Implementation of Protection-Restricting
Attorney General and BIA Decisions to Allow for Judicial
Review
The “significant possibility” standard is protective and forward-facing. 345 It considers whether a screened-in applicant might, with better preparation in a full removal proceeding, show asylum eligibility down the line.
The primacy of the judiciary in declaring “what the law is,” considered in
light of this standard, favors building in time for review of agency decisions
by the federal courts of appeals. 346
Although agencies can interpret the law, with particular leeway for ambiguous statutes, they are not its final arbiters. Rather, the federal courts
claim that role in our constitutional order. Thus, irrespective of whether the
agency reaches an interpretation via Chevron step one or invokes its authority
under step two, Article III courts have the ultimate say on whether the
agency’s decision will stand as consistent with plain text, or as a reasonable

345. See supra Section II.B; see also 8 C.F.R. § 1.2 (2019); Inspection and Expedited Removal
of Aliens; Detention and Removal of Aliens; Conduct of Removal Proceedings; Asylum Procedures, 62 Fed. Reg. 10,312 (Mar. 6, 1997).
346. See supra Section I.B; see also Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
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construction of ambiguous text. 347 Until they do so, there remains a great
deal of uncertainty around whether the agency’s interpretation of law will
survive judicial review.
I posit that this aspect of constitutional design, combined with the statutory standard for credible fear proceedings, should prompt DHS to wait for
the federal courts of appeals to review protection-restricting DOJ decisions
before implementing them at the border. Although the determinations of law
of the Attorney General or BIA are immediately controlling upon DHS in the
merits stages, the “significant possibility” standard for credible fear logically
contemplates time for the Article III courts to first weigh in. Because the
judiciary has final say on what the law is, an agency precedent that rejects or
casts doubt on an applicant’s claim does not, standing alone, defeat a “significant possibility” that the applicant will prevail on the merits. Accordingly, in credible fear processes, DHS should adopt a wait-and-see approach
for protection-restricting DOJ precedent.
Caution and delay are warranted particularly if the restrictive decision
comprises a change in the agency position as it did in Matter of A-B-, which
overruled prior precedent accepting domestic violence asylum claims. 348 Under step two of the Chevron inquiry, the Court has stated that agency positions inconsistent with prior views merit less deference, 349 or even none at all
if not adequately explained. 350 Shifting agency interpretations are thus especially suspect, and more susceptible to ultimate rejection by the courts.
Justice Gorsuch’s decisions while on the Tenth Circuit bench support
temporal restraint, particularly when agency decisions invoke Brand X to
reach conclusions contrary to the federal courts. Per Guitierrez-Brizuela v.
Lynch, agency pronouncements that “effectively overrule[]” prior judicial
constructions are “not legally effective” until a reviewing federal court accepts the agency’s view under Chevron step two. 351 Yet, in direct conflict
with this view, the USCIS Guidance on Matter of A-B- instructed its officers
to “apply the case law of the relevant federal circuit court, to the extent that

347. It follows that restrictive analyses that are mere dicta and thus do not invoke delegated
interpretive authority should also not apply in credible fear interviews. In Grace, Judge Sullivan
concluded dicta statements are not entitled to Chevron deference. See Grace v. Whitaker, 344 F.
Supp. 3d 96, 138 (D.D.C. 2018).
348. See supra Section V.A.
349. Immigration & Naturalization Servs. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 446 n.30 (1987)
(“An agency interpretation of a relevant provision which conflicts with the agency’s earlier interpretation is ‘entitled to considerably less deference’ than a consistently held agency view.” (quoting
Watt v. Alaska, 451 U.S. 259, 273 (1981))).
350. FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 515 (2009) (“[T]he requirement that
an agency provide reasoned explanation for its action would ordinarily demand that it display awareness that it is changing position. An agency may not, for example, depart from a prior policy sub
silentio or simply disregard rules that are still on the books.”).
351. Gutierrez–Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1145 (10th Cir. 2016).
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those cases are not inconsistent with Matter of A-B-.” 352 In Grace v. Whitaker, Judge Sullivan correctly enjoined this portion of the USCIS policy memorandum, in addition to substantive illegalities in Matter of A-B-. 353 But it
would have been better, and wiser, for the agency not to have rushed implementation of a Brand X decision in the first place.
Finally, individual liberty interests further countenance a wait-and-see
approach for restrictive agency decisions at the border, particularly in light
of the substantial risk of rights violations. The agency’s speedy implementation of protection-restricting decisions at the border poses precisely the concern highlighted by Justice Gorsuch while on the Tenth Circuit bench in
Gutierrez-Brizuela, and again in his concurrence in Kisor v. Wilkie: that politicized administrative agents may imperil the legal rights of litigants, particularly those with minority or disfavored causes. 354
Indeed, should Chevron’s two step framework be overruled, as Justice
Gorsuch has urged, that would be all the more reason for DHS to delay implementing restrictive agency precedent at the border. Under Skidmore’s
more flexible and less deferential standard, an agency interpretation would
be even less likely to survive judicial scrutiny—and the agency thus even less
able to declare that administrative decisions defeat an applicant’s “significant
possibility” of prevailing on the merits.
But what about decisions that expand refugee protections? Must the
agency wait on implementing those in credible fear proceedings, too? The
answer, I believe, is no. Agency precedent recognizing greater protections
can be implemented immediately without violating the credible fear standard, precisely because a “significant possibility” is a screen-in standard. It
functions not to keep out every ultimately invalid claim, but rather to give
every potentially viable claim a chance in full proceedings. Moreover, protection-expanding decisions, even if later rejected by the courts, do not pose
the same risk of violating applicants’ rights in the interim. 355 Thus, BIA or
Attorney General decisions that expand the scope of refugee protection may
be implemented without violating the screening standard, risking refoulement, or curtailing applicants’ rights.

352. See USCIS GUIDANCE, supra note 290, at 8–9 (emphasis added); see also supra Section
V.B.
353. See supra Section V.C.
354. See supra Sections I.B, I.D.
355. Cf. supra Sections I.B, I.D (exploring Justice Gorsuch’s view that current deference frameworks risk violating individuals’ rights).
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Nonapplication in Credible Fear of Any ProtectionRestricting Attorney General and BIA Decisions Decided
Under Chevron Step Two

A second proposal is for the DHS simply not to implement any protection-restricting decisions of the Attorney General or BIA construing ambiguous statutes in credible fear screenings—irrespective of the outcome of judicial review. This approach is supported by the very instability caused by
the scope of agency options under Chevron step two—even where the agency
stays within bounds of reasonableness.
The fact that the agency can later change its mind within a range of permissible interpretations means that a Chevron step two agency decision lacks
permanence. This, in turn, creates a risk that implementation of the decision
in border screening interviews will lead to violation of the credible fear
screening standard: An applicant prevented from establishing a claim under
today’s narrow agency interpretation may, in theory, still prevail in the future
under a different agency interpretation. And indeed, this is what we saw in
the trajectory of agency precedent decisionmaking on domestic violence asylums claims—and what Ms. Rody Alvarado, the petitioner in Matter of R-A, herself experienced—as the prospects of prevailing in her merits case veered
widely under Attorneys General Reno, Ashcroft, and Mukasey. 356
Notably, although ultimately contrary to Congress’s intent to insulate
asylum adjudication from political interference (as I argue below and above),
the policy and political accountability rationales of Chevron 357 favor nonapplicability of agency decisions that construe ambiguous statutes to curtail
applicants’ rights in credible fear. For, under Chevron step two, agencies
have significant leeway and may be choosing between multiple reasonable
interpretations. If agency decisions on asylum can in fact properly hinge on
the political aims or foreign policy goals of a given administration, then the
same agency will likely reach a different conclusion under a future administration with different political orientations. Given the current backlog in
the immigration courts, merits cases can easily span multiple administrations,
and an applicant who seems to lack a “significant possibility” under today’s
agency interpretation may well prove their case down the line. Thus, DHS
arguably should not apply in credible fear any DOJ decisions that restrict
asylum protections under Chevron step two—even if those decisions do clear
the bar for reasonableness.

356. See supra Section III.A.
357. See supra Section I.A (discussing policy and political accountability rationale in Chevron
decision); supra Section I.D. (discussing Supreme Court asylum decisions engaging Chevron and
its policy and political accountability rationales).

2020]

REGULATING THE BORDER

431

c. Elevated Agency Consideration of the Protection-Oriented
Views of the Asylum Office
DOJ should also more carefully consider the views of DHS, rooted in
its specialized experience adjudicating asylum claims. One of the more
shocking aspects of Matter of A-B- is how little respect Attorney General
Sessions displayed toward the expertise and interests of a sister agency.
In the lead-up to his decision, the Attorney General declined DHS’s request to suspend briefing and to clarify his call of question.358 He even denied in part DHS’s motion for more time to submit briefing, which DHS explained it needed due to the complexity of the issues and the need for intraagency coordination. In its request, DHS highlighted that it “adjudicates
thousands of asylum-related matters (including affirmative asylum applications, credible fear claims, and reasonable fear claims) each year.” 359 But
this fact was not persuasive to Attorney General Sessions on either the motion
or the merits.
In his merits ruling, Sessions not only rejected DHS’s view that Matter
of A-R-C-G- was correctly decided, but also castigated BIA for accepting the
earlier positions of DHS in issuing its decision. As explained above, DHS in
A-R-C-G- agreed with the respondent that a social group based on nationality,
gender, and inability to leave a relationship could be cognizable, and the BIA,
in turn, agreed with both parties. 360 And because of this, Sessions asserted:
“A-R-C-G- was wrongly decided and should not have been issued as a precedential decision. DHS conceded almost all of the legal requirements necessary for a victim of private crime to qualify for asylum based on persecution
on account of membership in a particular social group.” 361 Sessions thus
drew a negative association between DHS’s agreement with the BIA and the
respondent, and the validity of the BIA precedent. He appeared to presume
that if DHS concedes any issues in cases before the BIA, the BIA should
decline to generate precedent in those cases.
I posit that the BIA in Matter of A-R-C-G-, and not Attorney General
Sessions in Matter of A-B-, got it right with respect to inter-agency persuasiveness and roles. DHS views, rooted in its experience adjudicating affirmative asylum cases, should not be dismissed out of hand by DOJ. One important caveat is necessary: It is the expertise of DHS via its asylum office
that should be persuasive here, not the prosecutorial interests of ICE. Unlike
the asylum office, ICE lacks specialization in humanitarian protection claims,
instead carrying out broad enforcement of the immigration laws. Similar lack
358. See supra Section V.A.
359. Motion on Certification to the Attorney General, supra note 270, at 4.
360. See supra note 214 and accompanying text.
361. A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316, 333 (A.G. 2018) (merits decision). “Because of DHS’s multiple
concessions, the Board performed only a cursory analysis of the three factors required to establish
a particular social group.” Id. at 331.

432

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 79:374

of specialization also merits de-emphasis of the views of CBP on asylum,
despite the present involvement of border enforcement agents in credible fear
interviews.
For its part, if DHS as a whole wishes to better persuade DOJ (and as I
argue below in Section VI.B.2, eventually the federal courts), it should find
ways to elevate the voice of its asylum office in official positions before the
BIA and Attorney General. This may be accomplished by, for example, ensuring that DHS counsel appearing before the BIA or Attorney General in
precedent-generating cases represent the interests and positions of the asylum
office, and not solely the interests of ICE. In Matter of A-B-, for example,
the ICE Office of Principal Legal Advisor alone appeared before the Attorney
General at the merits posture, whereas in Matter of R-A- and Matter of L-R-,
Counsel for USCIS, which houses the asylum office, also appeared.362 The
appearance of counsel for the asylum office should render DHS’s views more
persuasive. 363
2. Courts
I provide two recommendations for courts reviewing agency interpretations of asylum law. First, they must enforce the credible fear standard in a
way that gives proper credence to their own decisions as Article III courts.
Second, they should recalibrate Chevron review to favor agency subunits
with expertise in humanitarian protection.
a. Enforce the “Significant Possibility” Screening Standard in a
Manner That Preserves the Primacy of the Judiciary
Article III courts play an essential role in protecting asylum claimants
at the border. In Grace v. Whitaker, the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia properly concluded that Matter of A-B- and the USCIS
Guidance violated the law in several respects.364 The court’s speedy issuance
of a permanent injunction undoubtedly prevented DHS from refouling many
refugees. As mentioned, however, the injunction did not redress the injuries
of non-plaintiff asylum seekers removed under unlawful policies. It also left
in place a system in which future illegal precedent decisions of DOJ can be
quickly implemented in screening interviews, before the federal appeals

362. See supra note 212.
363. I recognize that competing interests within DHS make it difficult for DHS to elevate the
expertise of the asylum office over the prosecutorial interests of ICE in cases before the BIA and
Attorney General, especially since counsel for ICE litigates cases in the immigration courts on behalf of the Department. Toward that end, in my concluding Section, I propose structural changes
to the agency treatment of asylum claims. See infra Section VI.B.3.
364. See supra Section V.C.
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courts have their say. 365 For example, in 2019, DHS promptly implemented
a restrictive decision of Attorney General William Barr, Matter of L-E-A-, 366
which limited asylum claims based on family persecution. 367 DHS applied
the decision even in credible fear proceedings 368 despite L-E-A-’s inconsistency with decades of federal circuit court caselaw establishing the viability of family-based asylum claims 369 and with prior DOJ precedent. 370
The district court’s in-depth decision displayed a sophisticated understanding of asylum law on several substantive points. Yet, federal court review of credible fear policies might also reach a similar end—and an injunction or temporary restraining order could issue even more quickly—if the
courts simply ask: Has restrictive agency precedent been implemented in
credible fear screenings before the federal courts of appeals have weighed in?
If so, I posit that immediate implementation usurps the proper role of the
Article III courts, as I explain in greater detail in Section VI.B.1.a. Although
I do not repeat that whole discussion here, I underscore that courts should
recognize that in our constitutional order, their decisions, and not the
agency’s, ultimately control whether an applicant has a “significant possibility” of prevailing on the merits in an asylum claim. 371 This is currently true
under Chevron, and would be even more so in Chevron’s absence, which
would entail lesser deference to agency interpretations.

365. Individuals living in the District are placed into removal proceedings in Arlington, Virginia, and the Fourth Circuit thus hears their appeals. See EOIR Immigration Court Listing, DEP’T.
OF JUSTICE, https://www.justice.gov/eoir/immigration-court-administrative-control-list#Arlington
(last updated Feb. 3, 2020).
366. 27 I. & N. Dec. 581 (A.G. 2019).
367. Id. at 582.
368. U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., GUIDANCE FOR PROCESSING REASONABLE
FEAR, CREDIBLE FEAR, ASYLUM, AND REFUGEE CLAIMS IN ACCORDANCE WITH MATTER OF L-EA7
(2019),
https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/Laws/Memoranda/2019/USCIS_Memorandum_LEA_FINAL.pdf.
369. See, e.g., Hernandez-Avalos v. Lynch, 784 F.3d 944, 949 (4th Cir. 2015) (“[M]embership
in a nuclear family qualifies as a protected ground for asylum purposes.”); Aldana-Ramos v. Holder,
757 F.3d 9, 15 (1st Cir. 2014) (“It is well established in the law of this circuit that a nuclear family
can constitute a particular social group . . . .”), as amended Aug. 8, 2014; Ayele v. Holder, 564 F.3d
862, 869 (7th Cir. 2009) (“Our circuit recognizes a family as a cognizable social group . . . .”); Bernal-Rendon v. Gonzales, 419 F.3d 877, 881 (8th Cir. 2005) (“[P]etitioners correctly contend that a
nuclear family can constitute a social group. . . .”); Gebremichael v. Immigration & Naturalization
Servs., 10 F.3d 28, 36 (1st Cir. 1993) (“There can, in fact, be no plainer example of a social group
based on common, identifiable and immutable characteristics than that of the nuclear family.”).
370. See Matter of L-E-A-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 40 (B.I.A. 2017). Litigants filed a separate lawsuit
challenging application of L-E-A- in expedited removal. See Complaint, SAP v. Barr, No. 19-03549
(D.D.C. Nov. 22, 2019), https://cliniclegal.org/resources/asylum-and-refugee-law/sap-v-barr-complaint.
371. Or, the courts might ask another, arguably still somewhat simple question: Does the agency
decision invoke Brand X to restrict refugee protections in a manner that fundamentally reflects a
policy choice? This, too, could prompt courts to find a violation of the “significant possibility”
standard. See Section VI.B.1.b.
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Recalibrate Review to Favor Protection-Orientation and
Agency Expertise over Politically Driven Decisionmaking

On a more fundamental level, federal courts reviewing agency interpretations of asylum law should re-evaluate their approach to deference to
agency decisionmaking. I propose a shift toward protection-oriented agency
divisions, which would better adhere to congressional intent and design.
Although strains of Chevron’s democratic accountability rationale have
featured prominently in the Court’s asylum jurisprudence, 372 the laws of Congress in fact demand non-politicized decisionmaking. As explained above
and in Section II.A, Congress crafted the refugee definition and asylum system as an intentional rejection of politicized refugee decisions. Moreover, its
design of expedited removal situates border screenings squarely within the
protection-oriented and specialized asylum office, not within enforcementoriented divisions or even with higher-ranking DHS officials. 373
As mentioned, scholars have persuasively called for non-applicability
of Chevron to DOJ decisionmaking in asylum law, especially for decisions
by the Attorney General. 374 Even if the Court chooses to generally retain
Chevron in this space (or at all), however, it should recalibrate its inquiry to
more easily reject policy-driven decisions. It can and should do so via a
modified step two approach, which moves away from viewing asylum law as
implicating “sensitive political functions that implicate questions of foreign
relations,” 375 and towards elevating the other core justification of Chevron:
agency expertise in humanitarian protection. The Court should review with
particular scrutiny BIA or Attorney General decisions inconsistent with the
long-standing practice of the asylum office. And it should also more readily
reject as unreasonable DOJ decisions that fail to engage seriously with views
of the DHS informed by asylum expertise—as occurred in Matter of A-Bitself.
Should the Court wipe Chevron off the books and return to the more
flexible and less deferential Skidmore inquiry, that would be all the more reason to shift deference toward the specialized experience and humanitarian
orientation of the asylum office. For, as Justice Gorsuch observed in Kisor,
even absent Chevron, agency expertise will undoubtedly continue to serve as
an important consideration for reviewing courts. 376 Politicized asylum decisions of political actors would be far more suspect.

372. See supra Section I.E.
373. See supra Section II.C.
374. See supra Section VI.A.
375. Immigration & Naturalization Servs. v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 425 (1999) (quoting Immigration & Naturalization Servs. v. Abudu, 485 U.S. 94, 110 (1988)).
376. See supra Section I.D.
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3. Congress
Although my discussion centers on the proper roles of agencies and the
courts under immigration laws as written, I would be remiss not to conclude
with a few thoughts for policymakers beyond the confines of current statutory
design. The trajectory of domestic violence asylum law and the debacle of
Matter of A-B-’s hasty implementation countenance deeper structural
changes to asylum decisionmaking at the border. Allowing politicized actors
to guide protection decisions, especially in an early and procedurally limited
screening stage, has proven risky and unwise.
First, and most simply, Congress could end the use of expedited removal
against asylum seekers. As the trajectory of Matter of A-B- and the actions
of the current administration demonstrate, screening procedures at the border
are too rife with error and too easily manipulated by political actors to ensure
non-refoulement of refugees. And, even before A-B- and its faulty implementation, a growing chorus of experts, including DHS’s own Advisory
Committee on family detention, advocated for expedited removal’s end or
significant curtailment. 377 The simplest way to prevent refoulement of refugees at the border is to allow asylum seekers to pursue full merits claims
before the asylum office or immigration courts. Although Congress might
retain some basic level of screening to weed out fraudulent claims, preliminary assessments of the merits of claims, even under a low screening threshold, has proven flawed. 378 Eliminating credible fear screenings in favor of a
default merits adjudication would also bring the work of the asylum office
back to a sustainable level, thereby reducing the enormous backlog of affirmative asylum claims. 379
Short of elimination, Congress should act to insulate asylum decisionmaking at the border from political pressure. As an initial matter, it can
clarify that the favorable decisions of the federal courts, and not the Attorney
General or BIA, bind asylum adjudicators in border screenings. Although I
argue that the screening standard viewed in light of our system of government

377. See, e.g., Michele R. Pistone & John J. Hoeffner, supra note 182; CATHOLIC LEGAL
IMMIGRATION NETWORK, EXPEDITED REMOVAL AND FAMILY DETENTION: DENYING DUE
PROCESS 2 (2015), https://cliniclegal.org/file-download/download/public/147https://cliniclegal.org/sites/default/files/cara/Expedited-Removal-Backgrounder.pdf; U.S. COMM’N ON INT’L
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, supra note 184; U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., REPORT OF THE DHS
ADVISORY
COMMITTEE
ON
FAMILY
RESIDENTIAL
CENTERS
2–7
(2016),
https://www.ice.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Report/2016/ACFRC-sc-16093.pdf . I have previously made this argument as well. Karen Musalo & Eunice Lee, Seeking a Rational Approach to
Regional Refugee Crisis: Lessons from the Summer 2014 “Surge” of Central American Women and
Children at the US-Mexico Border, 5 J. ON MIGRATION & HUM. SEC. 137, 142 (2017).
378. See supra notes 182–184 and accompanying text.
379. See Meissner et al., supra note 160, at 11–13 (discussing the backlog of 320,000 merits
asylum cases before the asylum office as of June 2018, due in large part to diversion of asylum
officer time to credible fear screenings).
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requires this already, the agencies themselves have disagreed and could use
explicit constraints.
Congress should also elevate the role of the asylum office in the adjudicative structure. Currently, the views of the asylum office are often not adequately reflected in the positions of the DHS before the DOJ adjudicators and
the federal courts. Congress could mandate that, when issuing precedent on
asylum law, the BIA or Attorney General consider the views of the asylum
office represented separately from ICE’s counsel. This, in turn, will allow
reviewing federal courts to glean the extent to which BIA or Attorney General decisions are informed by DHS agency experts on asylum. Although in
my view the statute already prohibits officers engaged primarily in enforcement duties from conducting credible fear screenings, Congress could also
step in with strengthening language to ensure CBP does not encroach upon
the proper work of the asylum office.
Additionally, Congress should revisit its jurisdictional bars to federal
court review of credible fear adjudications, an agency process demonstrably
rife with error. Currently, immigration law provides asylum seekers with
little direct recourse for a negative credible fear finding. 380 Although Title 8,
section 1252(e)(3) of the United States Code allows systemic challenges
within sixty days of a new expedited removal policy, the time, forum, and
other limitations of that provision prevent full redress of injuries from unlawful screening decisions. 381
Lastly, the very delegation of precedent-setting adjudicative authority—
and adjudicative authority at all—to the DOJ in the immigration and asylum
space bears revisiting. A growing chorus of scholars, commentators, and experts have called for an independent Article I immigration court system to
house both immigration judges and the BIA. 382 Their discussions have articulated compelling consistency, efficiency, due process, and humanitarian
reasons for such reforms; 383 I add only one point here. Policymakers considering creation of Article I immigration courts should contemplate how to incorporate the specialization and protection-orientation of the asylum office
into any new system. Absent careful design, this critical voice may again be
380. See supra note 140 (explaining jurisdiction-stripping statutes and differing court of appeals’ conclusions on asylum seekers’ rights under the Suspension Clause in expedited removal);
see also supra Section II.B.
381. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(e)(3) (2012) (providing action against a policy must be brought in the
United States District Court for the District of Columbia within sixty days of implementation of
challenged policy and limiting scope of action).
382. See, e.g., Dana Leigh Marks, An Urgent Priority: Why Congress Should Establish an Article I Immigration Court, 13 BENDER’S IMMIGR. BULL. 3, 15–20 (2008); Jaya Ramji-Nogales et
al., Refugee Roulette: Disparities in Asylum Adjudication, 60 STAN. L. REV. 295, 386 (2007);
COMM’N ON IMMIGRATION, AM. BAR ASS’N, REFORMING THE IMMIGRATION SYSTEM 6-19 to 622 (2010), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/commission_on_immigration/coi_complete_full_report.authcheckdam.pdf.
383. See supra note 382.
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diminished or lost. For example, if the enforcement arm of the DHS (ICE)
continues to advocate for removal of an individual before an Article I generalist immigration judge, and if an Article I generalist immigration appellate
board sets applicable precedent, the views of the asylum corps may fail to
meaningfully inform resulting precedent. Professor David Koelsch has persuasively argued that on this point, we might look to the structure of Canada’s
Immigration and Refugee Board, wherein Refugee Protection Officers (in
many ways akin to asylum officers) actively participate in formal hearings
conducted by the Refugee Board. 384 He has suggested that a new Article I
system of immigration adjudication include strengthened powers of asylum
officers, including their participation before an Article I immigration court
and their independence from the DHS. 385 In light of the myriad of deficiencies we have seen in our current adjudicative structure, we should consider
other models.
Finally, it bears mention that even apart from ensuring proper agency
decisionmaking, Congress should condemn the Trump Administration’s blatant attempts to shut down asylum altogether. While restrictive agency precedent can be a huge hurdle for applicants, policies such as the “Alternative
Country Agreements” and “Migration Protection Protocols” issued outside
of adjudicative processes may pose an even graver threat. 386 Both the former—applied in credible fear through interim regulations—and the latter—
operating outside the credible fear context to force asylum seekers in regular
proceedings to wait in Mexico—threaten to prevent meaningful access to
asylum for the vast majority of Central American asylum seekers and others
at the U.S.-Mexico border. 387 These policies violate the laws of Congress
and run afoul of the design of our system of asylum, intended to ensure compliance with U.S. international law obligations toward refugees.
VI. CONCLUSION
The politicized treatment of asylum seekers at the border fundamentally
conflicts with the aims and design of our asylum laws. To correct against
discriminatory and ideological treatment of claims, Congress in 1980—in the
midst of the Cold War—implemented a comprehensive system to shift us
away from politically-driven refugee adjudications. In 1996, it built critical
protections for asylum seekers into expedited removal, which included formalizing the existence and expertise of a professionalized asylum office. Yet
today, a frenzy of executive policies target asylum seekers at our border in
384. David C. Koelsch, Follow the North Star: Canada as a Model to Increase the Independence, Integrity and Efficiency of the U.S. Immigration Adjudication System, 25 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J.
763 (2011).
385. Id. at 795.
386. See supra notes 250–257 and accompanying text.
387. See supra notes 250–257 and accompanying text.
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overtly politicized and punitive ways—treatment at least as concerning as the
refugee decisionmaking of any prior era. 388
Revised agency practices and recalibrated judicial review can help ensure fair screenings of asylum claims at the border. These must account for
inherent limits of rushed border interviews, the screen-in nature of the credible fear standard, and the importance of non-discriminatory and humanitarian
treatment of claims. In a Chevron world, the impermanence of agency decisions at step two of the inquiry favors delay or caution in applying restrictive
precedent at the border. In both a Chevron and possible post-Chevron world,
elevating the humanitarian orientation and expertise of the asylum office in
judicial review and agency approaches offers better fidelity to statutory design. So too does asserting the primacy of the judiciary in declaring “what
the law is” when considering whose statutory interpretations control a “significant possibility” screening standard. A combination of these steps will
better ensure non-refoulement of refugees at the border.

388. See supra Part IV.

